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ABSTRACT 
 Through the lenses of Apparatgeist Theory and the Theory of Networked Publics, 
this dissertation examines the civic and social implications of the contemporary television 
ecosystem, focusing on the phenomenon of binge-watching as it relates to political 
participation and empathic concern. Results of an online survey, including quantitative 
and qualitative measures, indicate that binge-watching television is a statistically 
significant factor in positively shaping political participation, both online and offline, 
regardless of the genre consumed. That said, news and informational programming 
served as the most powerful genre in predicting political participation. Additionally, this 
dissertation considers the role of empathy within the binge-watching ecosystem, as 
informed by the Theory of Narrative Empathy; most strikingly, results suggest that 
empathic concern relates negatively with binge-watching, regardless of genre consumed.  
However, the process of talking about the television shows binged proved to be a positive 
and statistically significant contributor to political participation, political discourse, as 
well as other-oriented dimensions of empathy. Implications and potential directions for 
future research and theory development are discussed.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Overview and Rationale 
The overarching goal of this dissertation is to contribute to the body of 
scholarship regarding the relationship between entertainment media and informal 
learning among media users. Generally, this dissertation aims to understand social and 
emotional dimensions of popular culture, shedding light on the ways in which viewers 
make meaning from entertainment experiences in the current media landscape where 
technological affordances offer unprecedented opportunities with regard to access and 
personalization. More specifically, it investigates contemporary television viewership, 
examining civic implications of today’s personalized and on-demand television 
ecosystem that is propelled by algorithmically informed streaming platforms such as 
Netflix, Hulu, Amazon Prime, and others.   
Building upon decades of past scholarship focused on traditional consumption of 
broadcast, cable, and satellite TV, in connection with more recent work on over-the-top 
(OTT), or internet-enabled, television, this dissertation explores the ways in which the 
new culture of TV connects with civic culture. To this end, I examine the relationships 
among consumption of OTT television and political participation as well as political 
discourse, considering the specific roles of 1.) empathy development among OTT TV 
users and 2.) engaging in discourse about the TV shows binged. Through an in-depth 
investigation of the OTT television ecosystem, I aim to uncover the contexts for informal 
civic education through popular culture.  
By way of background, in a recent study, my co-author and I (Groshek & 
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Krongard, 2016) unearthed an unanticipated positive relationship between time spent 
binge-watching television and both political participation and discourse in our 
investigation of streaming television. Previously, binge-watching has been defined as 
consuming three or more episodes of one specific series in a sitting (TiVo Research 
Group, 2015). The phenomenon of binge-watching is often linked with negative 
consequences, such as chronic illness (Keadle et al., 2015) and depression (Sung, Kang, 
& Lee, 2015). However, our findings suggested a prosocial implication that linked binge-
viewing with practices that support a healthy democracy (Groshek & Krongard, 2016).  
My co-author and I explained this unexpected positive relationship between streaming 
television and political engagement as potentially related to the active, engaged, and 
personalized nature of contemporary, streaming TV, in combination with politically 
charged atmosphere of a presidential election year.   
More specifically, OTT television consumption today requires dynamic 
engagement and deliberate choice on the part of the consumer (Lotz, 2014) which has 
resulted in opportunities for carefully curated, thoughtful TV experiences, challenging the 
“couch potato” stereotype often associated with television consumers of the past (Matrix, 
2014). My co-author and I suggested that perhaps these lean-forward, active habits 
extend beyond our media lives into our social and civic worlds (Groshek & Krongard, 
2016). That said, due to the exploratory nature of the inquiry, our original explanation of 
this unanticipated relationship is likely incomplete, leaving opportunity for further 
investigation to more thoroughly understand the relationship between political 
participation and binge-watching TV. Furthermore, while our original findings suggest a 
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positive correlation, our relatively limited investigation of differences among TV genres 
necessitates additional research (Groshek & Krongard, 2016). 
Thus, this dissertation further examines the relationship between political 
participation and streaming television consumption in depth and explores alternative 
theoretical underpinnings for the phenomenon. First, I retest the association to determine 
whether this phenomenon persists or is a 2016 anomaly, and, second, I delve more deeply 
into the civic and social elements of narrative consumption in today’s digital media 
ecosystem. I examine the role of empathy and the ways in which its various dimensions 
relate with binge-watching, with a lens toward the role of TV genre. More specifically, 
this dissertation investigates the relationships among binge-watching, empathy, and 
political engagement, considering the ways in which these forces inform and speak to one 
another. Furthermore, I evaluate the extent to which talking about television plays a part 
in the dynamic among TV consumption, political discourse, and political participation.  It 
is with this framework that I dissect and analyze today’s OTT streaming television 
ecosystem and its consequences.   
Television, Redefined 
Evolving technology, evolving culture. 
Television is in a state of evolution. What once was a clearly defined household 
appliance is now an amorphous construct lacking a specific shared definition (Lotz, 2018; 
Lotz, Lobato, & Thomas, 2018; Olsson & Spigel, 2004). No longer confined to the living 
room, “television” in the post-network era can now be consumed at any time and in any 
location with an Internet connection via portable electronic devices such as smartphones 
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and tablets (Lotz, 2014; 2018). Although traditional television remains the predominant 
form of media consumed among Americans, streaming television is on the rise (“The 
Total Audience Report,” 2018), where viewers are moving toward digital aggregators 
such as Netflix and Hulu (Liesman, 2018; Pew Research, 2018). A 2018 study from 
Deloitte identifies the main attraction to streaming television as the freedom to view 
content on-demand, personalized choices, and access online original programming 
available through platforms (“Meet the MillenXZials,” 2018). In 2018, 48% of all U.S. 
consumers stream TV content daily or weekly, which is an 11% increase since 2017 
(“Meet the MillenXZials,” 2018).  
As suggested by my co-author and I in our previous study (Groshek & Krongard, 
2016), streaming television is an emergent, unique technology that blends affordances of 
mass and social media, therefore necessitating new, distinctive research. More 
specifically, streaming platforms integrate content originally created for traditional TV 
networks, blending programming from the past with contemporary technology in an 
example of convergence culture (Jenkins, 2006). The term convergence culture (Jenkins, 
2006) suggests the collision or intersection of old and new media, where new 
technologies allow for rediscovery and potential transformation of past media texts. For 
example, the long-running sitcom Friends (1994 - 2004) was originally part of NBC’s 
Must-See TV Thursday lineup (Miller, 2018) and is now identified as one of the most 
frequently binge-watched television shows of 2018, streamed via Netflix (Spangler, 
2019).   
A show like Friends was crafted within the context of linear, synchronous content 
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delivery, adhering to the logic of mass media (Altheide & Snow, 1979); here, NBC 
would release weekly programming as a unidirectional transmission to a mass audience.  
The television audience would receive episodic content each Thursday evening, engaging 
in a shared cultural experience, and then collectively wait until the following week for the 
next episode to be released. Now, this content is part of the contemporary TV ecosystem, 
where the technological capabilities afforded are more reflective of social rather than 
mass media logic (van Dijck & Poell, 2013).  
  The term social media logic (van Dijck & Poell, 2013) suggests a reliance on data, 
connectivity, and user engagement. Such networked technologies, including streaming 
platforms, allow users to interact with, curate, and even dictate (Alvarez- Monzoncillo, 
2015) the experience, supported through algorithmic recommendations informed by 
viewership data (van Dijck & Poell, 2013). For example, those who viewed all of Friends 
on Netflix may be prompted by the platform to move on to a program with comparable 
features, such as the FOX sitcom New Girl (2011-2018) which similarly features a group 
of twenty-something friends living together in an urban environment and is available to 
stream on Netflix.  Here, the technology is in constant dialogue with the viewer’s specific 
preferences.  
When a show that originated during the mass media era, like Friends, is available 
for streaming, this linear content is experienced through new technologies, demonstrating 
the process of collapsing old and new media where the user experiences a blend of 
affordances (Jenkins, 2006). The consumption patterns for a show like Friends then shift 
accordingly, as viewers are able to access the content anytime and anywhere with an 
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internet enabled device. Instead of the unidirectional experience afforded by mass media, 
streaming television allows for dynamic interactivity, responding to and driven by the 
user. Unlike Friends, a program created specifically for OTT engagement such as 
Netflix’s Black Mirror or the fourth and fifth seasons of Arrested Development 
capitalizes upon the affordances of OTT television to craft an entirely original, interactive 
television experience. In the cases of both Black Mirror and Arrested Development, 
which will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter, the affordances of the 
technology itself contributed to and informed the method of storytelling.  
Thus, streaming television presents a unique hybrid of old and new media and 
serves an example of convergence culture (Jenkins, 2006), where content from the 
broadcast and cable eras of TV is integrated with the functionalities inherent in social 
media, such as algorithmic filtering, personalized recommendations, and on-demand 
consumption (Lotz, 2014). This dissertation aims to give concentrated attention to this 
evolving form of television to better understand its social and civic implications. 
Binge-watching & binge-watchers: Understanding contemporary consumption. 
The combination of unique affordances presented by streaming television, such as 
time-shifting and perpetual access via personal communication devices, has resulted in 
changes to viewership habits, rituals, and expectations. Specifically, on-demand access to 
a wealth of content has resulted in binge-watching becoming a cultural norm among TV 
consumers across all ages (“Meet the MillenXZials,” 2018). According to a recent 
Deloitte study of consumer behavior in the United States, 91% of Generation Z (fourteen 
to twenty-year olds), 86% of millennials (twenty-one to thirty-four-year olds), and 80% 
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of Generation X (thirty-five to fifty-one-year olds) binge-watch television frequently, 
while the average across all age groups of those who binge-watch frequently is 75% 
(“Meet the MillenXZials,” 2018).  Despite the negative connotation embedded within the 
term “binge” (Jenner, 2017; Perks, 2014), binge-watching is viewed favorably among 
viewers (TiVo Research Group, 2015).   
To more fully explicate the term “binge-watching”, this dissertation recognizes 
that there is some ambiguity with regard to a shared definition among scholars (Jenner, 
2015). While many subscribe to the definition described above, of consuming three or 
more episodes of a series in one sitting (TiVo Research Group, 2015), the phrase is 
sometimes defined in a more generalized way, such as Oxford Dictionaries’ definition of 
“watch[ing] multiple episodes of a television programme in rapid succession, typically by 
means of DVDs or digital streaming” (“Binge-watch,” 2013). Despite the lack of a 
precise shared definition, the term is generally understood as consuming large quantities 
of one specific series or program in a short period of time (Jenner, 2015). For the 
purposes of this dissertation, consuming three or more episodes of one program in one 
sitting will serve as the definition used to ensure clarity and specificity (TiVo Research 
Group, 2015). 
Further demonstrating the ways in which technology intersects with consumption 
patterns and norms, Netflix released information in 2017 on how its subscribers were 
viewing programming and identified a new term, “binge-racing”, to highlight the 
emergent competitive nature of binge-watching (McCall, 2017). Netflix asserts that 
binge-racers consume a program within 24-hours of the program’s release (Dwyer, 
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2017). Netflix maintained that there were over 8.4 million Netflix members who binge-
raced through shows for the bragging rights and cultural capital associated with 
completing the show at such a rapid rate (Dwyer, 2017).   
This example of binge-racing suggests that viewing behavior may be intimately 
linked with the relational dynamics of social reality. Here, streaming TV viewers seem to 
have collectively attached norms, rules, and symbolic forms of capital to their 
consumption practices as a means to distinguish themselves from one another and create 
a hierarchy within their contemporary media culture (Jenner, 2015). Viewers often 
identify bingeable texts as of higher quality and therefore justify the time they spend 
marathoning content (Perks, 2015). Jenner (2015) suggests that binge-watching has 
helped to foster a culture that normalizes fandom, where it is now mainstream to become 
deeply involved in TV texts. Thus, the rise of binge-watching and the subsequent concept 
of binge-racing suggests that streaming TV viewers exist within and is informed by a 
dynamic and evolving social context. 
The social capital associated with binge-viewing, and even binge-racing, may be 
exacerbated due to the role of social media as a means for sharing and connected 
viewing, particularly through live-tweeting. Live-tweeting is a type of “second-
screening,” where media users engage in multiple media experiences simultaneously (Gil 
de Zúñiga, Garcia-Perdomo, & McGregor, 2015). This process has become increasingly 
popular and important for programming, as indicated by Nielsen’s integration of Nielsen 
Social which reports on which TV shows engender the most social engagements (“About 
Nielsen Social,” 2018). Although the time-adjusted nature of streaming television may 
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seem to make it more difficult to engage with other viewers through social networks, 
research suggests that the number of social tweets about time-adjusted streaming 
television is the same as the number messages shared while live-tweeting traditional 
television (Pittman & Tefertiller, 2015).  
While research on binge-watching is still in its infancy, past studies have 
examined this means of consumption through sundry lenses. For example, from a critical 
analysis perspective, Jenner (2017, 2018) has investigated changes to programming and 
storytelling. Several studies investigate motivation for binge-watching, which range from 
entertainment and sensation seeking to the need for control (see Panda & Pandey, 2017; 
Pittman & Sheehan, 2015; Rubenking & Bracken, 2018; Shim & Kim, 2018), while 
others attempt to understand the patterns of media binge-behavior (Perks, 2014).  
Recently, in their within-subject pretest, post-test experiment, Walter, Murphy, and 
Rosenthal (2018) found that time spent binge-watching reduced the level of identification 
viewers had with TV characters. The authors suggest that perhaps binge-watching 
encourages superficial, automatic processing rather than deep engagement with material 
(Walter, Murphy & Rosenthal, 2018).  
With regard to content, I recently conducted a study with a co-author 
investigating the representations of violence in online original programming from a 
cultivation theory perspective (Gerbner & Gross, 1976), considering the ways in which 
streaming consumption relates with worldview of viewers (Krongard & Tsay-Vogel, 
2018). Cultivation theory (Gerbner & Gross, 1976) asserts that those who spend more 
time consuming television content are more likely to see the world through a TV lens; 
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specifically, these individuals often view the world as a fearsome place, where people are 
generally unkind (Gerbner & Gross, 1976). In our study, we found that those who 
consumed more of the popular binge-watched shows tended to see the world as a scary, 
negative places, consistent with traditional cultivation theory findings (Gerbner & Gross, 
1976).   
As the next chapter will examine in depth, there is a large body of existing work 
that analyzes the relationships between civic engagement and traditional broadcast or 
cable television. However, to my knowledge, there is no other current research examining 
the relationship between over-the-top TV, binge-watching, and political participation 
among consumers, aside from some of my previous work (Groshek & Krongard, 2017; 
Krongard & Groshek, 2017). Therefore, this dissertation aims to fill another important 
gap in the body of literature and explore political and civic consequences of this emergent 
form of TV. 
Storytelling in the age of streaming.  
Due to the rise of binge-behavior, many programs are now being developed 
specifically for web-enabled aggregators such as Netflix’s House of Cards and Hulu’s 
The Handmaid’s Tale. Online original programming is thus designed for streaming with 
binge-watching in mind. For example, season four of Arrested Development was 
produced for Netflix and crafted specifically for on-demand viewing (Jenner, 2016), 
meaning that the full season arc lacks linearity. Rather, the episodes can be consumed in 
any order, as story unfolds by revealing new layers and perspectives of the same 
occurrence throughout the season. The program seems to reward binge-viewing by 
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integrating ongoing inside jokes and visual gags that speak to immersive viewing (Jenner, 
2016). The creator of Arrested Development, Mitchell Hurwitz, stated that developing the 
show for a streaming platform encouraged him to create the season more like a novel, 
suggesting there is more consumer control and less need for prescriptive guidance from 
the program itself (Tryon, 2015). In other words, the full season was created and 
designed deliberately for a close reading over a short period of time, compared with 
programs that were structured for weekly release. 
That said, in the recent study mentioned above (Krongard & Tsay-Vogel, 2018), 
which analyzed online original programming, we found that, despite the relative freedom 
from traditional network TV constraints, television shows created specifically for OTT 
television platforms demonstrate intense, graphic, and significant violence, infused with 
traditional and stereotypical representations of race and gender. Therefore, while online 
platforms may present the promise of a new and exciting approach to television content, 
this content analysis suggests the persistent use of conventional television tropes found in 
the cable and broadcast world (Krongard & Tsay-Vogel, 2018).  
Some programs are using the digital affordances of streaming TV to venture into 
unprecedented terrain, such as the Netflix original program Black Mirror (2011 - present) 
which integrated a choose-your-own adventure style of storytelling within its 2018 
installment of the anthology series. Taking the form of an interactive movie, rather than a 
traditional multi-episode season, Black Mirror: Bandersnatch invites viewers to interact 
with the characters within the television show, making decisions that appear to directly 
influence the outcome of the story which heightens the engagement and personalization 
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of the experience. For example, the viewer is encouraged to make choices for the 
protagonist throughout the program, from something as simple as which music he listens 
to on a bus to a more major decision like whether he accepts or refuses a job offer (Shaw-
Williams, 2018). The content that proceeds depends on the viewer’s decisions, even those 
that may initially seem trivial.   
Here, Black Mirror illustrates a shift away from traditional storytelling and form, 
engaging directly with the viewer and pivoting from typical episodic structure. This shift 
in storytelling is yet another example of technological convergence (Jenkins, 2006) where 
affordances of various media collide and inform one another. Black Mirror: 
Bandersnatch integrates elements of traditional choose-your-own adventure texts, as well 
as video games and feature films, crafting a new form of television.  
A matter of genre. 
 The variation in format and storytelling within over-the-top television has added 
complications to the already complex topic of television genre. In general, genre is a 
means of classification, providing a systematic means of dividing elements into smaller, 
more manageable categories based on similar attributes (Creeber, 2015). Lacey (2000) 
specifically highlights the importance of these specific categorizing attributes that allow 
materials to be grouped with comparable texts, such as style, format, and narrative. Genre 
persists across various art forms, including music, film, and literature, and is inherently 
nebulous and subjective (Creeber, 2015). For example, something as broad as “fiction” or 
as specific as “historical melodrama” may both be considered genres, resulting in a 
challenging terrain for empirical analysis. The identification of genre originated with the 
  
13 
Ancient Greeks who articulated the differences among patterns, tones, and rhythms in 
storytelling (Creeber, 2015); notably, Aristotle articulated the various elements that 
comprise poetry genres such as epics, tragedies, comedies, and dithyrambic poetry in 
Poetics (Aristotle, 350 B.C.).  
Contemporary genre theory attempts to detangle the complicated TV genre 
terrain, particularly as hybridization of different genres is becoming increasingly 
prevalent. For example, the onslaught of reality programming, particularly during the 
early 2000s, spurred a variety of new hybrid genres (Mast, 2009) such as the unique 
blend of soap opera, documentary, and game show, depicted through popular 
programming such as The Bachelor (2002 – present), The Bachelorette (2003 – present), 
Bachelor in Paradise (2014 – present), and Love Island (2015 – present). The 
classification system for TV genre must be flexible in order to accommodate the rapid 
shifts that are often caused by audience demand and response to certain emergent 
programming (Mittell, 2001). In other words, the television industry responds to audience 
feedback by providing more of what generates the highest viewership and thus greatest 
revenue (Mittell, 2001).   
Further, technological functionality provides more space for creativity and 
variation in form, resulting in unprecedented television styles. For example, when HBO 
emerged in the 1990s as a subscription cable channel, it offered a new and seemingly 
elevated style of programming, along with its catchphrase that separated itself as a novel 
artform: “It’s not TV. It’s HBO” (Tryon, 2015). HBO created revolutionary TV 
programming such as Sex and the City (1998 - 2004) and The Sopranos (1999 – 2007) 
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that represented a more sophisticated, cinematic style of TV than basic network and cable 
content (Tryon, 2015). Streaming platforms are demonstrating a similar pivot, where 
OTT television distancs itself from traditional TV with regard to content, form, and 
structure through their original programming; as New York Times writer Poniewozik 
(2015) posits, streaming platforms provide not only new ways to watch but also 
unprecedented programming that could indeed be constituted as a new genre in itself.  
More specifically, series are continually released through streaming platforms that 
do not align with previous standards of what constitutes a television program, as 
illustrated through the aforementioned example of Black Mirror: Bandersnatch. Both 
format and storytelling inform the genre; for example, in July of 2019, Hulu released four 
hour-long episodes of the romantic comedy miniseries, Four Weddings and a Funeral, 
with one additional episode released each Wednesday for the following six weeks 
(O’Keefe, 2019). Here, the structure of the program, which is loosely based on the 1994 
film of the same name, highlights the intersection old and new television. Releasing four 
hours of content at once allows for an immersive experience that is more reminiscent of 
film than television, perhaps with a nod toward the original motion picture. Then, the 
series also adheres to the more traditional TV model, with a weekly release of the 
following episodes.  
Thus, as technology, storytelling, and programming evolves, the definitions and 
categories must evolve accordingly, in an ongoing effort to move with the full ecosystem. 
As Mittell (2011) emphasizes, a discursive approach to genre ensures that media texts are 
put into conversation with one another; the program itself is not viewed and analyzed in 
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isolation. Rather, programs are defined, interpreted, and assessed through ongoing 
interactions with the full collection of programming (Mittell, 2011). In an examination of 
the contemporary television landscape, an explication of the content is necessary to 
understand the ecosystem in its entirety. 
Conclusion 
We are currently experiencing the television turn, where dynamic shifts in 
technology, viewership, and storytelling inform one another and together generate new 
cultures of consumption. Affordances, viewer engagement, and content continue to 
evolve and intertwine in a dynamic, ongoing interchange, resulting in a complicated and 
ever-changing definition of the term “television.” The boundaries of traditional TV 
storytelling are shifting in response to the technological functionality afforded by the 
medium, moving from linear and episodic to nonlinear and asynchronous. Consumption 
is rapid, social, and constantly in flux, with continuous movement.  These changes have 
resulted in a new television ecosystem, and it is with this framework that I examine 
binge-watching and its relationship to civic and social life.  
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CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
Theoretical Overview 
The following chapter describes the theoretical foundations of this dissertation, as 
well as the relevant past literature upon which the current work builds. Figure 1 
highlights the ways in which this dissertation integrates theories and relevant concepts to 
generate the proposed research questions and dissertation goals.  
Figure 1. Representation of the integration and synthesis of theoretical frameworks applied 
to this dissertation. 
 
Apparatgeist Theory (Katz & Aakhus, 2002) serves as an overarching framework that 
informs this work philosophically; the lens of Apparatgeist Theory ensures that this 
dissertation examines the micro and macro social implications of this emergent 
technology, detangling the forces and dynamics that comprise the OTT TV ecosystem.  
The Theory of Networked Publics (boyd, 2010) is incorporated as a lens through which 
to view the role of streaming television technologies in the civic lives of consumers, 
particularly the ways in which discourse regarding popular culture relates with political 
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and civic talk. The Theory of Narrative Empathy (Keen, 2006) supports my inquiry into 
the possibility for streaming television consumption to potentially speak to empathic 
concern and cognitive perspective-taking among viewers. Furthermore, this piece 
evaluates the ways in which empathy connects with political engagement, examining 
both discourse and action. While this dissertation does not investigate causation, it 
examines the ways in which these social and civic forces speak to one another, revealing 
depth of the OTT TV ecosystem. The following literature review explicates each of these 
theories and concepts in greater depth. 
Theoretical Framework: Apparatgeist Theory (Katz & Aakhus, 2002) 
 At the core of this dissertation is the philosophy that media users are active agents 
for creativity and decision-making in their relationships with technology, consistent with 
the foundational elements of Apparatgeist Theory (Katz & Aakhus, 2002) which is the 
major theoretical frame at the heart of this research. As Apparatgeist Theory suggests, 
technology emerges in response to, rather than dictating, human needs, and 
simultaneously, the capabilities of specific tools offer unique affordances and constraints 
which then interact with social processes, empowering a particular set of behaviors 
among technology users (Katz & Aakhus, 2002). While this theory rejects technological 
determinism, which suggests that the tools themselves dictate changes to social needs, 
behaviors, and norms, Apparatgeist Theory emphasizes the fluid, cyclical, and dynamic 
relationships among individuals, media, and society, where each informs and is informed 
by one another (Katz & Aakhus, 2002).  
For example, Katz and Aakhus (2002) suggest that, upon the introduction of the 
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mobile phone, various countries demonstrated persistent changes in social norms, 
interpersonal expectations, and patterns of behavior, despite vast cultural differences. The 
specific technological affordances and biases, such as the seamless ability to remain in 
constant contact, interacted with human needs and expectations to ultimately facilitate 
emergent mobile phone rituals, such as the general expectation to respond to texts in a 
timely manner (Katz & Aakhus, 2002). Here, technology may speak to the need for love, 
belonging, and acceptance through sense of connection, a basic human need (Maslow, 
1943). While prior Apparatgeist research focuses most strongly on mobility as an 
example of the ways in which emerging media can shape and is shaped by social needs, 
the theory is technology agnostic and rather aims to understand the patterns and processes 
to shed light on the social change and individual meaning crafted with and from 
technology adoption. Thus, this specific dissertation applies Apparatgeist Theory to 
streaming television, attempting to deconstruct the habits, norms, and processes that 
connect streaming TV with civic and social lives. 
From perpetual contact to perpetual content. 
Embedded within the Apparatgeist Theory is the concept of “perpetual contact”, 
which suggests that the interaction between the technological affordances of mobile 
phones and the social rules that humans have attached to these tools has led society to a 
place of continuous engagement (Katz & Aakhus, 2002). The human drive for connection 
(Maslow, 1943), in combination with the specific functionalities of the mobile phone 
engendered this culture of perpetual contact which suggests dynamic, kinetic movement 
and persistent need for social engagement. This dissertation therefore builds upon the 
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concept and applies the idea of perpetual contact to television; more specifically, this 
dissertation investigates today’s culture of perpetual content and argues that the 
proliferation of over-the-top television, personal communication devices, and the 
seemingly insatiable desire for entertainment have in combination resulted in a culture 
where viewers are in almost constant engagement with television content.   
 Contemporary mobile devices allow for on-demand access to television content 
through a variety of applications. According to Nielsen’s 2018 Total Audience report, as 
subscriptions to video on-demand services such as Netflix and Hulu increase, the use of 
smartphones and tablets to streaming content via apps increases accordingly (“The 
Nielsen Total Audience Report,” 2018). Specifically, Americans consumed TV through a 
television glass (meaning television set or TV-connected device such as a game console) 
in real-time or time-adjusted five minutes less in 2018 than 2017, while consumption of 
digital video (via computer, smartphone, or tablet) increased by two minutes (“The 
Nielsen Total Audience Report,” 2018). This finding demonstrates that the use of 
personal computing devices for television access is slowly but surely on the rise.   
 Further suggesting a shift away from traditional in-home television consumption 
toward an era of perpetual content access, Out-of-Home (OOH) viewing is becoming 
increasingly accessible and taking place in diverse locations due to constant connectivity 
(“TV Keeps Us Entertained,” 2019).  “Out-of-Home” viewing is a term especially in 
audience measurement to understand the full ecosystem of television and media 
consumption.  The Nielsen Corporation (2019) released a report examining Out-of-Home 
(OOH) Television consumption and suggest that OOH viewing takes place wherever 
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consumers might be, including friends’ homes, hotels, gyms, airports, and in transit (“TV 
Keeps Us Entertained,” 2019).   
This dissertation seeks to understand the implications of continuous access to and 
connection with streaming TV, through personal communication devices like 
smartphones and tablets. Thus, Apparatgeist Theory serves as an overarching theoretical 
framework that propels this research and provides a philosophical foundation for the 
work. The dissertation then recruits additional theories to inform the nuance and 
complexity of the civic and social dynamics. 
Theoretical Frame: Networked Publics (boyd, 2010) 
This dissertation applies, builds upon, and expands the Theory of Networked 
Publics (boyd, 2010), aiming to understand the ways in which civic life, and particularly 
civic discourse, is enabled by and potentially activated in today’s technological 
ecosystem. According to boyd (2010), networked publics are defined as “publics that are 
restructured by networked technologies” (p. 39) emphasizing the importance of both the 
architecture of the networked space, as well as the real or imagined community that exists 
within this space. According to boyd (2010) networked publics are “simultaneously (1) 
the space constructed through networked technologies and (2) the imagined collective 
that emerges as a result of the intersection of people, technology, and practice” (p. 39).  
This dissertation examines OTT TV as a connected space that deserves unique attention 
through the lens of the public sphere.  
With regard to architecture of networks, boyd (2010) emphasizes that the specific 
design and functionalities can influence the ways in which the community engages. For 
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example, a “Profile” page on a network such as Facebook serves as a means for users to 
engage in self-representation rituals and exercise control over their online persona, 
speaking to the human need for self-esteem and individualism (Maslow, 1943). 
Overlapping with the articulation of Apparatgeist Theory (Katz & Aakhus, 2002), boyd’s 
(2010) suggests the importance of the interaction between human needs and 
technological functionality, demonstrating how these dimensions engage to create 
culture, norms, and expectations.  
Regarding the “public” element of the theory, boyd (2010) highlights the 
importance of the community of individuals who are a part of the specific networked 
space and embraces the potential messiness of the term “publics”, emphasizing that the 
term has been subject to varied interpretations and ambiguous definitions. For example, 
from the perspective of Habermas (1962/1989), the public may be defined as those 
citizens who are engaged in civic life; for Habermas (1962/1989) the “public sphere” is 
defined as physical spaces where citizens can engage in rational, cohesive, and logical 
discourse regarding issues of social and civic life.  
Habermas’ (1962/1989) work on the theory of the public sphere has been 
critiqued from a variety of perspectives. For example, Habermas’ concept of the public 
excluded those who lacked privilege in the society, such as people of color, women, and 
those from lower socioeconomic classes (see Fraser, 1990). Warner (2002), on the other 
hand, presents the definition of “public” as “social totality” (p. 49) in a holistic sense and 
suggests that public may also be constrained to concrete place. Further extending the idea 
of “public”, Warner (2002) suggests that there may be many rather than one specific 
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public, and individuals are often included and excluded from many publics 
simultaneously. Similarly, Gitlin (1998) articulated the concept of counter-publics, or 
“sphericules”, which resist the dominant narrative purported by the main public sphere. 
Further research on these counter-public sphericules suggest that these groups, which are 
increasingly prevalent in today’s fragmented media landscape, offer important alternative 
interpretations that push back against the hegemonic narrative presented by the dominant 
public sphere (Groshek & Han, 2011).  
Livingstone’s (2005) conception of “public” as akin to “audience” speaks 
particularly well to this dissertation. Livingstone (2005) investigates the roles of media, 
consumption, and culture in the public sphere, and questions when the public becomes 
the audience and vice-versa, complicating the definition of both of these key terms.  
Livingstone (2005) emphasizes that the term “audience” suggests a shared reception of a 
specific text, while “public” may suggest more active engagement in culture.  However, 
Livingstone (2005) questions the distinction, suggesting that perhaps the term “audience” 
should suggest more active engagement rather than passivity and that “public” ought to 
also embody the idea of shared consumption and interpretations of cultural texts.   
Thus, the current dissertation questions the ways in which streaming television 
audiences are activated as an engaged public through engagement with the technology 
itself, adopting Livingstone’s conception of audience as public and extending the Theory 
of Networked Publics. Perhaps through increased interactive functionalities, OTT 
television serves as a connected virtual space that engages and stimulates civic discourse 
and perhaps helps to cultivate an active public. As Livingstone (2005) suggests, perhaps 
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these two roles, audience member and public citizen, are actually quite closely 
intertwined.  In both cases, individuals simultaneously receive cultural messages and then 
engage as active participants in the social dialogue.  
Streaming publics? Talking our way to engagement.  
It is with the above theoretical framework that this dissertation investigates the 
ways in which streaming television plays a role within the networked public sphere.  
Building upon boyd’s (2010) theory and particularly Livingstone’s (2005) idea of the 
audience as public, in combination with the foundational philosophies of Apparatgeist 
Theory (Katz & Aakhus), this dissertation investigates the extent to which the discourse 
engendered by streaming television texts relates with civic engagement and political 
participation.  
For the purposes of this dissertation, the term “civic engagement” serves as a 
broad umbrella concept which captures all activity where citizens engage with their 
society and government (Adler & Goggin, 2005). The term “political participation” more 
directly examines actions related to influencing the government (Ekman & Amnå, 2012). 
Political discourse is a form of civic engagement that helps cultivate civic identity 
(Walsh, 2004) and is critical to the health and wellbeing of a thriving, active democracy 
(McCoy & Scully, 2002).  
Looking specifically at the content of discourse that arises within the public and 
networked public spheres, this dissertation analyzes the role of informal conversation 
stimulated by TV texts. In his seminal work, Habermas’ (1962/1989) emphasis on the 
importance of rationality, logic, and coherence within the public sphere has been 
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challenged by scholars who have highlighted the need for additional emotions, such as 
humor (Benacka, 2016), gossip (Frost, 2011; Temple, 2012), and storytelling (Dahlberg, 
2005). Lyotard (1984) cited the importance of strong emotions and individuality which 
can make power social change, as in the example of anarchist movements. Papacharissi 
(2014) similarly highlighted the importance of strong emotion in her work on affective 
publics, which builds upon boyd’s (2010) Theory of Networked Publics and suggests that 
social media has provided opportunities for online solidarity to build from shared 
emotions. These powerful emotions can activate a group of empowered individuals who 
then use social networking platforms to organize and implement change (Papacharissi, 
2014).  
Turning specifically to television, Graham and Hajru (2011) and Graham (2012) 
suggest that engaging in online discourse about reality television, which has been deemed 
detrimental to political engagement (Shah, 1998), can actually serve as a trigger for 
political talk.  In content analyses of reality TV discussion boards, Graham and Harju 
(2011) and Graham (2012) found that discussions of social behaviors and lifestyle 
decisions, prompted by conversation about the TV program, led to civic discourse. Such 
findings demonstrate the power of seemingly frivolous content to generate important, 
thoughtful engagements about our civic and social lives.   
Relatedly, in some of my existing work (Krongard & Groshek, 2017), my co-
author and I also reported a positive link between streaming television and talking 
politics, highlighting the importance of dialogue in the engagement process. Thus, this 
dissertation investigates the ways in which discussion of binge-watched television plays a 
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role in the relationships between streaming TV consumption and political engagement. 
Television and civic engagement: Historical perspective. 
This relationship between TV and civic engagement has been investigated since 
the early days of the medium. Scholars have investigated the influence of television on 
civic life, particularly comparing this emerging technology to older forms of media such 
as newspapers and radio. For example, Lang and Lang (1956) aimed to understand the 
political implications of television through a series of interviews; their qualitative 
analysis suggested that television may produce greater interest in politics among viewers 
while perhaps limiting the scope of viewers’ understanding by offering one seemingly 
omniscient perspective (Lang & Lang, 1956). In a quantitative analysis, Glaser (1965) 
found that owners and watchers of television voted more frequently than non-owners and 
non-watchers; however, voting turnout for TV viewers was lower than for newspaper 
readings. Gentzkow (2006) investigated political engagement during the Golden Age of 
television through a historical analysis of election surveys and found that the onset of TV 
coincided with a decline in newspaper and radio consumption, as well as political 
knowledge. 
 During the cable-era of television, critics identified the rise of television as 
detrimental to the civic mindedness of viewers. For example, in 1985, Neil Postman 
published his frequently cited and controversial text Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public 
Discourse in the Age of Show Business. Postman identified television as a particularly 
superficial medium that both favors and perpetuates a culture of entertainment rather than 
deliberate discussion and debate through an emphasis on spectacle, appearances, and 
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hedonism. Postman suggests that TV pivots the culture away from thoughtful and 
reflective conversation, which are critical elements for an informed democracy.  In 
addition to Postman (1985), Putnam (1995) identified television as the culprit of the 
demise in social capital, defined as the “connections among individuals - social networks 
and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from it” (Kindle Locations 
152-153).   
Several studies refuted Putnam’s perspective, such as Uslaner (1998) disproving 
TV’s negative relationship with social trust and Moy, Scheufele, and Holbert (1999) 
refuting Putnam’s assertion that time spent with television displaces time that could be 
spent on civic and social engagements. However, while Moy et al.’s (1999) study 
contradicted the specific time-displacement theory, it simultaneously supported Putnam, 
suggesting a negative relationship between time spent watching television and civic 
engagement. Echoing Putnam, Simon (1996) found voter turnout was negatively related 
to TV viewership and positively to newspaper readership. Such research continued to 
demonstrate a somewhat complicated and inconsistent relationship between TV and civic 
life.  
To complement the studies that examined implications of time spent with TV, 
research has also examined the content consumed as it relates to civic engagement and 
political participation. Several studies suggest that information seeking behaviors via TV 
such as news viewership relates positively to political participation, while TV for 
entertainment and escape relates negatively (Norris, 1996; Shah et al., 2001). Similarly, 
in today’s digital environment, social media used for news consumption and information 
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seeking has also been linked positively with civic engagement (Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, & 
Valenzuela, 2012; Shah et al., 2001).   
However, studies on entertainment content suggest that this positive relationship 
is not limited to news consumption. For example, Shah (1998) found that viewership of 
upbeat sitcoms relates positively to social trust, perhaps due to the time spent with kind, 
close-knit friend groups represented on screen, while dramas related positively with civic 
participation, as these programs may encourage viewers to consider social issues. Further 
extending the relationship between entertainment and civic engagement, van Zoonen 
(2005) suggested the behaviors and practices of engaged television fandom may translate 
into social and civic life, thus accelerating political participation. 
Therefore, the current dissertation aims to build upon this substantial body of past 
research to understand the contemporary television landscape and its relationship with 
civic engagement in an era of streaming platforms, binge-watching, and constant 
connectivity. 
Theoretical Frame: Theory of Narrative Empathy (Keen, 2006) 
 To further untangle the relationships between and among television consumption 
and political engagement, this dissertation integrates and contributes to the theory of 
narrative empathy which originated within the field of fictional literature (Keen, 2006). 
This theory asserts that fictional narratives can serve as a sort of social simulation for the 
consumers of the narrative, and by engaging actively with the worlds depicted through 
complex fictional literature, readers can foster their capacity for empathy.  These 
perspective-taking practices then may transfer into their real-world lives, perhaps 
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connecting with other-oriented civic behaviors, such as political participation and 
discourse about the social worlds of others. Consumers of fictional narratives encounter 
and are asked to consider the lives and perspectives of various characters, practicing the 
cognitive and emotional habits necessary to develop a strong sense of social empathy.  
Thus, this dissertation applies the Theory of Narrative Empathy (Keen, 2006) to explore 
the ways in which various dimensions of empathy play a role in the OTT television 
ecosystem and its potential relationship with political engagement. 
Defining empathy. 
From a social-neuroscience perspective, “empathy” is composed of three major 
components (Decety & Jackson, 2006): “(a) an affective response to another person, 
which often, but not always, entails sharing that person's emotional state; (b) a cognitive 
capacity to take the perspective of the other person; and (c) emotion regulation” (p. 54).  
The first component, or the affective response, speaks to the commonly held idea of 
empathy as emotional mimicry or emotional contagion, where an individual demonstrates 
the ability to feel what another person feels. (Decety & Jackson, 2004).  
However, the second component of empathy, or cognitive perspective-taking, is a 
more difficult, complicated process where individuals practice and execute the ability to 
adopt, synthesize, and coordinate perspectives of others (Decety & Jackson, 2004; 
Selman, 2003; Kim et al., 2018; Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-Peretz, & Perry, 2008).  
Cognitive perspective-taking is the capacity to recognize the mental state as well as the 
holistic context that serves as a rationale for why someone may experience specific 
emotional states (Premack & Woodruff, 1978).   
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In studying empathy, Davis (1980, 1983) suggested additional dimension of 
empathy, beyond emotional contagion (or empathic concern) and cognitive perspective-
taking. Davis (1980) identifies fantasy, or the ability for individuals to connect with 
characters in stories, plays, television, or films, as an additional dimension of empathy.  
Finally, Davis (1980) also incorporates personal distress, or the experience of feeling 
personally bothered by the distress or pain of others. Davis (1983) contrasts personal 
distress, self-oriented feelings of anxiety or discomfort, with empathic concern which is 
other-oriented.   
This cognitive ability to adopt the perspectives of others is linked to prosocial 
attitudes and behaviors, such as the reduction of stereotyping (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 
2000), decreased bullying (Ang & Goh, 2010), reduction of prejudice (Doyle & Aboud, 
1995), decreased in-group bias (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000), and increased altruism 
(Oswald, 2010). As these associations demonstrate, cognitive empathy is linked to issues 
related to social justice, understanding the contexts, experiences, and needs of others.  
Linking empathy directly to civic engagement, the personality trait of empathic concern 
has been positively related to civic participation (Bekkers, 2005; Penner, 2002; Penner & 
Finkelstein, 1998).   
Technology, storytelling, and empathy. 
Broadly speaking, the relationship between media and the development of 
empathy is an area of continued investigation. Turkle (2015) identifies technology as a 
culprit in the widespread empathy deficit; Turkle (2015) proposes in her recent 
qualitative study of contemporary media use that mobile technology allows individuals to 
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disconnect from one another, while remaining tethered through technology. Turkle 
suggests that empathy develops through sustained, robust social engagements and that 
emerging technology is therefore “implicated in the assault on empathy”, creating an 
empathy gap that begins in childhood and continues through adulthood (2015, p. 4, 32). 
This perspective speaks to the research of Postman (1985) and Putnam (1995) discussed 
previously, generally suggesting that technology distances rather than connects. 
Others, however, identify technology as particularly well positioned to help 
foster empathy rather than hinder its development. For example, Manny (2008) maintains 
that technology serves as a vehicle for storytelling, and stories allow individuals to access 
as well as understand the perspectives of others. Nishida (2013) highlights the capacity 
for artificially intelligent agents to help facilitate empathy among humans. Due to its 
immersive affordances, virtual reality has been especially lauded for its capacity to 
encourage empathy (Herson, 2016). 
From a care perspective, virtual reality may serve as a means to teach empathy to 
caregivers and social workers engaging with Dementia patients (Donahoe, Moon, & 
VanCleave, 2014). Specifically investigating television, several studies have examined 
the ability for viewers to develop empathy toward fictional TV characters through the 
process of identification (Cohen, 2001; Tal-Or & Cohen, 2011). Here, viewers develop 
parasocial relationships, (Rubin, 1987; Perse & Rubin, 1989) which refer to unrequited 
affections expressed toward media personalities, both real and fictional.  
Pivoting from parasocial (Rubin, 1987; Perse & Rubin, 1989; Cohen, 2004) 
affections, television has also demonstrated the potential capacity to promote the skills of 
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empathy that transfer from the mediated to the social world. To this end, this dissertation 
builds upon prior work that explores empathy development and fictional literature (Mar, 
Oatley, Hirsh, Paz, & Peterson, 2006; Mar & Oatley, 2008; Kidd & Castano, 2013) as 
well as the relatively small amount of research on empathy through traditional television 
consumption, through the lens of narrative transportation theory (Green & Brock, 2000); 
narrative transportation theory suggests that much of media enjoyment comes from being 
immersed in narrative worlds (Green & Brock, 2000). This high level of immersion 
allows consumers to connect with the characters on an emotional and potentially 
empathic level.  
Narrative empathy: From literature to television. 
Reflective of Keen’s (2006) theory of narrative empathy, Mar, Oatley, Hirsh, Paz, 
and Peterson (2006) found that those who engaged more with fictional text predicted 
measures of social ability, while nonfiction print text exposure was a negative predictor.  
Even more notably, Mar et al. (2006) found that the tendency to become absorbed in a 
story predicted empathy scores above participants. Mar and Oatley (2008) found that 
fictional literature can serve as a type of simulation, allowing readers to engage in the 
process of abstraction regarding social reality. Similarly, Kidd & Castano (2013) 
determined that readers of literary fiction, as opposed to non-fiction and popular fiction, 
also performed better on affective empathy tasks. 
  Studies on television and empathy offer similar findings as those described above. 
Nathanson, Sharp, Alade, Rasmussen, and Christy (2013) found that preschoolers who 
consumed television content and then subsequently discussed the TV program with 
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parents demonstrated enhanced cognitive perspective-taking; however, those children 
who had simply televisions in their bedrooms and solely used television as background 
noise performed worse on cognitive perspective-taking evaluations (Nathanson, Sharp, 
Alade, Rasmussen, & Christy, 2013). Here, a distinction between active, critical 
engagement with television texts and passive, mindless consumption emerges; cognitive 
perspective-taking abilities are heightened through more dynamic interaction with the 
television texts.   
Additionally, in a more recent study, Black and Barnes (2015) discovered that 
adult viewers of critically acclaimed television dramas demonstrated higher levels of 
cognitive perspective-taking than those who consumed documentaries. Here, Black and 
Barnes (2015) therefore reveal that it is critical to examine not only how television is 
viewed but also the content consumed when evaluating its relationship to perspective-
taking. 
Contemporary television storytelling is often labeled “literary” or “cinematic” in 
order to demonstrate the shift toward more complex, challenging material (Mittell, 2015).  
Mittell (2015) suggests, however, that the changes to TV content are not to be understood 
through a comparison with another medium; rather, content evolved due to the nature of 
the changing technology and contemporary viewership. Recent research demonstrates 
that binge-watching is linked to feelings of narrative transportation and immersion 
(Tukachinsky & Eyal, 2018) which indicates that perhaps the experiences of immersion 
and transportation found in literature, along with its consequences, may be similar in 
today’s culture of mainstream high-brow streaming television. 
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Empathy and civic engagement. 
 This dissertation explores the ways in which empathy, potentially in relation to 
narrative engagement, may help to foster political discourse and participation among 
consumers. While the terms “civic engagement” and “political participation” often are 
defined in varying ways among scholars (Adler & Goggin, 2005) and often conflated 
(Ekman & Amnå, 2012), in the broadest conception of the terms, civic engagement refers 
to “all activity related to personal and societal enhancement which results in improved 
human connection and human condition” (Diller, 2001, p. 22). Put another way, civic 
engagement refers to “the interactions of citizens with their society and their 
government” (Adler & Goggin, 2005). Both of the above definitions encompass specific 
activities, including civically minded actions like writing a letter to a Town Selectman or 
volunteering at a soup kitchen, as well as indicators of political participation, such as 
voting. Therefore, to be civically engaged is to think and act in support of the well-being 
of society, considering the experiences, lives, and needs of the individuals who make up 
the community rather than focusing on oneself; these are the foundational elements 
embedded within other-oriented dimensions of empathy.   
In explicating the concept of political participation and considering its relation to 
television, this dissertation investigates the role of narrative specifically with regard to 
streaming TV and its capacity to engender empathy. The current investigation of 
television and empathy is unique in several ways. First, to my knowledge, there is no 
existing research on empathy development within the post-network era of TV. Secondly, 
this study uniquely explores both the evolving content and structure of new television 
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environments; by examining both the technological and storytelling dynamics, this study 
aims to shed light on the ways in which these critical elements of the viewing experience 
unite to support critical engagement in today’s ever-changing television climate. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 To better understand the contemporary streaming television ecosystem, the above 
framework provided a complex litany of concepts that this dissertation aims to connect 
and investigate. The intention of this dissertation is not to identify causation but rather to 
unearth relationships and identify the ways in which these powerful forces interact with 
one another.  It is with this framework that I present the following research questions. 
 First, this dissertation investigates the relationship between political participation 
and binge-watching television previously found in the prior work I conducted with my 
coauthor (Groshek & Krongard, 2016) to explore whether these findings persist across 
samples and time, and to explicate this phenomenon in greater depth. 
RQ1: What is the frequency of binge-watching among respondents? 
H1a – b: Increased time binge-watching television will be positively related to 
both a) online and b) offline political participation. 
H2a – b: Increased time binge-watching television will be positively related to a) 
online and b) offline political talk. 
Due to the limited investigation of genre in our earlier research (Groshek & 
Krongard, 2016), this dissertation aims to investigate the differences among TV genre as 
open, exploratory research questions rather than posing specific hypotheses: 
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RQ2a – b: How does the genre of programs binged relate with both a) online and 
b) offline political participation?  
RQ3a – b: How does the genre of programs binged relate with time spent 
engaging in political talk a) online and b) offline? 
With regard to empathy, this dissertation investigates the ways in which various 
dimensions of empathy (Davis, 1980) relate with binge-watching and civic engagement. 
Again, while there are related studies that explore media consumption and empathy, this 
dissertation is the first investigation of OTT, streaming television and the different 
dimensions of the construct. Therefore, the following research questions are presented as 
exploratory, without specific directionality or hypotheses.  
RQ4a – d: How does binge-watching relate with operational dimensions of a) 
perspective-taking, b) empathic concern, c) fantasy, and d) personal distress?  
Finally, building upon prior work regarding civic discourse and television, this 
dissertation aims to understand the ways in which discussion relates to the streaming TV 
experience: 
RQ5:  To what extent do viewers discuss the TV programs they binge? 
RQ6a – b:  In what ways does talking about binge-watched television relate with 
political participation, a) online and b) offline? 
RQ7a – b: In what ways does talking about binge-watched television relate with 
political talk, a) online and b) offline? 
RQ7c: What other topics (political and apolitical) arise within these 
conversations?  
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CHAPTER THREE: METHOD 
Pilot Survey: Developing a Shared Language  
In order to investigate the research questions and hypothesis presented above, I 
conducted a survey which was informed through data gathered in a smaller-scale pilot 
survey. The pilot survey informed the development of my main survey questions 
regarding interpretations of binge-watching and genre. I used the information gleaned 
from this pilot survey to craft a robust and substantial list of genres to integrate within the 
main survey to ensure that the list of genres resonated with streaming television viewers. 
Additionally, the pilot survey served as a way to understand the extent to which the 
interpretation of genre is subjective, objective, or somewhere in between; this knowledge 
allowed me to phrase my main survey questions in an accessible manner. The pilot 
survey enabled me to ascertain the language that would speak to individuals who are not 
necessarily media scholars but rather casual viewers and users of media. This small pilot 
provided access to mostly qualitative data that informed the development of the main 
survey.  
Data were collected via the research and survey company Qualtrics, which 
employed an opt-in panel.  Participants in this dissertation research had to be 18-years old 
or older, live in the United States, and speak English to participate (N = 125).  
Respondents were 48.8% male and 51.2% female. With regard to race and ethnicity, 
62.4% of participants were White / Caucasian, 13.6% reported African-American, 16.8% 
Hispanic / Latino, 5.6% Asian, and 1.6% reported Native American.  0% indicated 
Pacific Islander.  36% were between 18- and 34 years-old, while 12% was between 25 
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and 34 and 19.2% was between 35- and 44-years old. 16% was between 45- and 54-years 
old, and 16% were 65-years old or older.  Here, it was important for this survey to focus 
on the younger adult population, between 18 and 35-years old, as this is the group that 
demonstrates that strongest binge-watching behavior (“Meet the MillenXZials”, 2018), 
and the pre-survey aimed to better understand interpretations of binge-watching and 
genre.  
This survey used an adapted version of Netflix’s categorizations of TV genres 
from their binge-scale report as a starting point to understand the extent to which these 
specific genres resonated with viewers (“Netflix and Binge,” 2016). As mentioned 
previously, OTT television and streaming platforms have produced unprecedented styles, 
formats, and conventions for television, perhaps resulting in unique genres. Therefore, 
this dissertation employed the Netflix list of TV genres as it was crafted specifically for 
an OTT environment. In order to understand interpretations of genres, this questionnaire 
asked participants to categorize a list of Emmy-nominated TV shows they had seen as 
one of the listed genres. The following programs were included: Atlanta (FX), This is Us 
(ABC), Westworld (HBO), Barry (HBO), Black-ish (ABC), The Crown (Netflix), The 
Handmaid’s Tale (Hulu), Curb Your Enthusiasm (HBO), Glow (Netflix), Game of 
Thrones (HBO), Stranger Things (Netflix), The Americans (FX), Silicon Valley (HBO), 
The Marvelous Mrs. Maisel (Prime Video), The Unbreakable Kimmy Schmidt (Netflix).  
The adapted list of genres is as follows: irreverent comedy, political drama, historical 
drama, superhero drama, crime drama, dramatic comedy, action / adventure, sci-fi, 
horror, thriller, news / informational, sports, and other.  Respondents could insert a genre 
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of their choosing if they did not find the list of genres sufficient.  
 
Main Survey 
Overview. 
Data for the main survey were collected over the period of April 8, 2019 through 
April 23, 2019 and comprised 526 respondents from an opt-in panel accessed through 
Qualtrics, a research and survey company.  Participants were required to be 18 years-old 
or older and live within the United States. Qualtrics ensures that the sample is reflective 
of the general US population, but there are limitations with regard to perfect 
generalizability using an opt-in panel. That said, similar samples are being used within 
the field and apply inferential statistics (Baker et al., 2010; Peifer & Garrett, 2014; 
Boulianne, 2015).  
Demographics. 
In terms of gender, there were 111 male respondents (21.3%) and 409 female 
respondents (78.6%).  The median age was 42 years old (M = 42.67, SD = 16.18).  
Turning to yearly income, 24% eared $24,999 or less, 33.6% earned between $25,000 
and $49,999, 30.2% reported making between $50,000 and $99,999, 10.1% earned 
between $100,000 to $199,999, .8% reported making between $200,000 and $299,999, 
and finally, 1.3% reported earnings of $300,000 and above. With regard to race and 
ethnicity, 62% identified as White/Caucasian, 12.4% of respondents identified as African 
American, 16.8% as Hispanic / Latinx, 5.3% Asian, .6% Native American, .2% Pacific 
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Islander, and 2.7% identified as Other. Thirty percent reported living in an urban area, 
while 47.9% identified their location as suburban and 24.2% indicated rural.  Although 
these percentages aim to reflect the general population of the United States, these 
demographics are imperfect; while this sample can offer insights into the general 
population, it is not precisely generalizable due to both its size and disparity in gender 
distribution. 
Political antecedents. 
Consistent with the conventions for studies within the field of political 
communication, this survey examined the political affiliation, political ideology, and 
political knowledge of respondents through self-reports. Here, 23% identified as 
Republican, 45.4% Democrat, 26% reported Independent, 1% indicated Other, and 4% 
reported Don’t Know.  This survey measured political ideology using a scale from 1 
(very liberal) to 7 (very conservative) (M = 4.04, SD = 2.12). Using a series of seven 
multiple choice questions, such as identifying the number of Supreme Court Justices and 
naming the Speaker of the House of Representatives, this survey measured general 
political knowledge (M = 4.31, SD = 1.94): 18.7% of respondents answered all questions 
correctly, and 14.1% and 13.9% answered six and five questions correctly, respectively. 
Fifteen and a half percent (15.5%) answered four questions correctly, while 17.0% and 
12.6% answered three and two questions correctly respectively.  Just over seven percent 
(7.3%) answered one correct answer while 1% answered all questions incorrectly. 
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Political participation. 
Online political participation (Cronbach’s alpha [α] = .91) and offline political 
participation (α = .92) were measured through a series of seven items that have been 
validated in past political communication research (Gil de Zúñiga, Molyneux, & Pei 
Zheng, 2014). Participants were asked to share how often in the past twelve months they 
have engaged in specific activities on a scale from 0 (never) to 4 (always).  For online 
political participation (M = .92, SD = .78), items included activities such as posting 
comments about politics to social media, subscribing to a political listserv, or creating 
posts for a blog about current events.  Similar items measured offline political 
participation (M =. 59, SD = .80) except these activities referred to offline engagement 
that cannot easily be replicated online, such as attending a political rally, voting in a local 
or statement election, and posting a political sign, banner, or bumper sticker.  
This study also examined the use of social media for political participation 
through a nine-item scale where respondents indicated the extent to which they agreed 
with certain statements about social media use sounded like them on a scale from one 
(strongly disagree) to five (strongly agree) (α = .91). Items included statements such as 
social media allows me to “take part in activist causes” and “helps me to find people I 
trust to solve problems in my community.” These statements allowed respondents to 
share their use of social media for engagement with more nuance than the general 
political participation questions. That said, it is important to note the correlational overlap 
with the political participation questions; for online political participation, the correlation 
was statistically significant and positive but somewhat weak (r = .336, p < .001), and 
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offline political participation suggested a slightly weaker but statistically significant and 
positive correlation (r = .272, p <.001). 
Talking politics. 
Respondents were asked to share the frequency with which they talk about 
politics both online and offline. This survey measured these two variables on two eight-
item scales which asked respondents to share on a scale of one (never) to five (always) 
how frequently they engaged in discourse with a variety of individuals including family, 
people they know well, people from different social classes, and strangers. For the offline 
measurement (α = .93), the average was 2.36 (SD = .93) and for online (α = .961) the 
average was 2.11 (SD = 1.01). These two variables were strongly correlated with one 
another (r = .809, p < .001) indicating those who talk politics seem to do so both on- and 
offline. 
Media use. 
To examine the ways in which contemporary media use relates with political 
engagement and empathy, it was critical to develop an overall understanding of media’s 
role in the lives of participants. Respondents identified the time in hours spent per day 
using all social media platforms where they have a profile (M = 4.61, SD = 4.25).  
Additionally, respondents reported the number of hours per day they spent watching 
television on various devices: smartphones (M = 3.23, SD = 4.39), tablet (M = 1.62, SD 
= 3.01), laptop (M = 2.05, SD = 3.44), desktop computer (M = 1.88, SD = 3.57), 
television through online streaming (M = 3.34, SD = 4.19), and traditional television 
  
42 
such as broadcast, cable, or satellite (M = 4.03, SD = 4.32).   
To understand the overall consumption of television, a new variable was 
computed, combining the number of hours spent watching TV on all devices (M = 16.20, 
SD = 17.27). Additionally, a new variable was created to capture nontraditional TV 
consumption which combined the hours spent watching television via smartphones, 
tablets, laptops, desktop computers, and online streaming (M = 12.16, SD = 14.87).  
Here, the flaws of and bias inherent within self-reported data were apparent because the 
cumulative hours of television added up to far more than 24 hours for some respondents.  
That said, these numbers are reflective of the attitudes and memories viewers have of 
their consumption patterns. 
Binge-watching. 
To understand the frequency of binge-watching, respondents were asked to share 
how many television programs they have binge-watched in the month prior to completing 
the survey (M = 1.75, SD = 1.95). Here, binge-watching was defined within the question 
as watching three or more episodes of one specific TV program in a sitting.   
Next, participants were asked to share how frequently they view specific genres 
when they binge-watch. Here, respondents indicated how frequently they consumed each 
genre when binge-watching using a sliding scale from zero (never) to five (sometimes) to 
ten (always). Participants shared the frequency with which they binged irreverent 
comedies such as Arrested Development (M = 3.03, SD = 3.07), political dramas such as 
House of Cards (M = 2.53, SD = 2.94), historical dramas such as Marco Polo (M = 2.34, 
SD = 2.78), superhero dramas such as Supergirl (M = 2.73, SD = 3.12), crime dramas 
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such as Better Call Saul (M = 3.81, SD = 3.36), dramatic comedies such as This Is Us (M 
= 3.81, SD = 3.41), dramas such as Mad Men (M = 2.97, SD = 3.20), action and 
adventure such as 24 (M = 3.26, SD = 3.13), science-fiction such as Stranger Things (M 
= 3.38, SD = 3.35), horror such as American Horror Story (M = 3.51, SD = 3.50), 
thrillers such as Dexter (M = 3.26, SD = 3.32), news and informational programs such as 
documentaries or political talk shows (M = 2.80, SD = 3.18), sports including games and 
commentaries (M = 2.33, SD = 3.10), reality programs such as Keeping Up with the 
Kardashians (M = 3.24, SD = 3.39), and other (M = 1.53, SD = 2.60). 
Respondents were also asked to share the extent to which they discuss the shows 
they binge-watch. This variable was measured through three items, where respondents 
indicated the frequency with which they talk about the shows on a scale from zero 
(never) to five (always) (α = .78). Questions inquired about how often respondents talked 
with people they knew well like friends and family (M = 3.11, SD = 1.09), people they 
do not know very well such as acquaintances (M = 2.28, SD = 1.16), and strangers or 
people only met online (M = 2.09, SD = 1.22). A total talking television variable was 
created, combining the frequency of the three items above (M = 2.50, SD = 1.09).  
Empathy. 
In order to understand the relationship between new methods of television 
consumption and empathy, this dissertation employed the Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
(IRI) (Davis, 1980, 1983) discussed previously within the literature review as the 
instrument for measurement of empathy. This instrument uses four seven-item subscales 
to assess four dimensions of empathy. Respondents indicated the extent to which certain 
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statements describe them, ranging from one (does not describe me at all) to five 
(describes me very well).   
The perspective-taking (PT) subscale (M = 3.52, SD = .60) speaks to the ability to 
adopt the cognitive position of others, measured by statements such as, “I try to look at 
everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision” and “I sometimes try to 
understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their perspective.” The 
empathic concern (EC) subscale (M = 3.72, SD = .67) measures affective empathy, or the 
ability to feel compassion and sympathy for others, measured through items such as, “I 
often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me” and “I would 
describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person.” The PT subscale addresses the cognitive 
dimension of empathy while EC measures the emotional contagion element.  
The fantasy subscale (M = 3.21, SD = .67) applies particularly well to media, as it 
examines the ability to be transported into stories or fictional narratives and is measured 
by statements such as, “When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I 
would feel if the events in the story were happening to me” and “After seeing a play or 
movie, I have felt as though I were one of the characters.” Through this subscale, the IRI 
assess the extent to which individuals assume the perspectives and feelings of fictional 
characters, applying empathy to the world of narrative.  
Finally, the personal distress (PD) subscale (M = 2.82, SD = .74) examines the 
self-oriented perspective of empathy, measuring the extent to which the distress of others 
makes the individual personally uncomfortable and is associated with fear, uncertainty, 
and anxiety (Davis, 1980).  PD is measured through items such as, “I sometimes feel 
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helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional situation” and “In emergency 
situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease.”  The PD scale provides the self-focused 
dimension of empathy, while the EC and PT subscales are more focused on the other-
oriented elements.   
The Interpersonal Reactivity Index provides four scales that are considered 
relatively independent; it is important to note that combining the final score does not 
provide an ultimate empathy score for the respondent (Davis, 1980). Rather, the four 
subscales are to be used independently to measure the various and specific dimensions 
that comprise the construct. 
Qualitative Analysis: Talking about Television 
In order to gain insight into what topics viewers discuss when talking about 
television programs they have binge-watched, the survey incorporated an open-ended 
question that read, “Consider a show you recently binge-watched and discussed with 
someone else. What topics came up during your conversation?” This question was 
deliberately phrased as simply and clearly as possible to encourage specific focus on the 
topics discussed. Almost sixty-eight percent (67.7%) of respondents provided an answer 
to this question that was analyzed through a qualitative lens, adding potential more 
nuance to survey findings.  
The responses were analyzed using a combination of open and focused coding 
strategies (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 1995). Responses were analyzed line by line to 
identify any and all emergent themes. Simultaneously, I examined the data considering 
the themes that speak to the core research questions in mind; more specifically, because 
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the focus of this dissertation is mostly on political and civic life, I began with “civics and 
politics” as a major category. As I moved through the data, I developed the following 
sub-codes for the “civics and politics” code: specific policies (example: “The Green New 
Deal”); issues of identity in society (example: “about life being black”); political 
behavior (example: “Just about who I will vote for a d [sic] really agree to”); public 
health (“women’s health”); issues of political concern example: “human trafficking”, 
“climate change”). Within the sub-code of issues of identity in society fell topics of race, 
class, and gender (example: “We recently binge-watched Poldark and discussed how 
difficult life was in the 19th century, especially for women and poor people”). 
Additionally, codes unrelated to civics and politics included the following: 
specific show / genre (example: “Shameless” or “Comedy”); structural elements of the 
show (example: “the cast”), connection to / appreciation of the show (example: “WHAT 
THE SHOW WAS ABOUT AND HOW THE CHARACTERS EVOLVED [sic]”), and 
applications of the show to real-life (example: “family living close to you.”).  These final 
codes were established after sifting through the raw data to identify the emergent patterns 
within the responses. 
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Chapter 4: Results  
Pilot Survey 
Defining binge-watching. 
The qualitative results from this pilot survey suggested that binge-watching is a 
commonly understood term in a general sense. Participants were given the chance to 
write-in a definition for the term, and while there was variation regarding the specific 
number of hours or episodes, the overall interpretation seemed quite universal.  For 
example, many respondents shared something similar to the following general definition: 
“Watching a show for numerous hours [sic]” while others were more specific with regard 
to the number of hours (for example, “More than 8 hours of TV a day [sic]” and 
“Watching a series of shows consecutively.  Four hours or more [sic]”).  Regardless of 
the specific time allotments, the general understanding seemed to be the same among the 
majority of respondents.  Most respondents demonstrated an understanding that binge-
watching was defined as consuming large quantities of television for long period of time.   
However, despite the shared general understanding, the pilot survey revealed that 
the specific time-allocations for what constituted binge-watching varied among 
respondents. Therefore, I recognized the need to offer a precise definition within the main 
survey to ensure that respondents were using consistent parameters when answering 
binge-related questions. To this end, I incorporated an exact definition and specified the 
parameters of consuming three or more episodes of one program in one sitting (TiVo 
Research Group, 2015) within the main survey to help ensure that binge-watching was 
interpreted as universally as possible.  
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Interpreting genre. 
Additionally, results from this exploratory pilot survey suggested that respondents 
did not interpret genres uniformly and seemed to struggle with the concept of genre in 
general. For example, respondents were asked to list as many television genres as they 
could think of and were encouraged to make the list exhaustive. Responses were 
extremely inconsistent, ranging from lists of specific television programs, (for example, 
“shameless, house of cards, nashville, law and order svu [sic]” and “south park futurama 
the simpsons rick and morty [sic]”) to decades (for example, “80s 90 200s [sic]”), to lists 
of very inconsistent genres (for example, “sports animals cars [sic]” and another, 
“comedy-sports-drama-action-adventure [sic]”). Others expressed overall confusion 
about the term (for example, “i dont [sic] know what you are looking for. give examples 
[sic]” and “Have no idea what you want [sic]”).   
To address this challenge in the main survey, I incorporated very specific 
definitions and included examples for each genre mentioned to try to create a shared 
understanding of the category in question.  
Main Survey 
Binge-watching and political participation. 
This dissertation began by investigating the frequency of binge-watching and 
found that 27.9% of respondents reported never having binge-watched, where binge-
watching was defined as watching three or more episodes of one specific TV program in 
a sitting. Similarly, 23.3% reported binge-watching one program in the month prior to 
taking this survey, and 23.5% reported binge-watching two programs during this period 
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of time. There was a decrease in binge-watching three programs, resulting in 13.5%. The 
highest amount of binge-watching was practiced by the smallest number of respondents, 
where 6% binge-watched four programs in the past month, and 2% binge-watched five 
programs. The percentage jumped up to 8% with regard to bingeing six or more programs 
during this time period.   
H1a – b asserted that increased time binge-watching television will be positively 
related to both online and offline political participation. I employed a bivariate 
correlation matrix of all relevant variables not only to illustrate the relationship between 
binge-watching television and political participation but also to be able to offer a general 
understanding of additional relationships present in this study. Findings offered support 
for these hypotheses, suggesting that there are statistically significant but relatively 
modest positive relationships among the number of programs binge-watched during the 
past month and both online (r = .327, p < .001) and offline (r = .279, p < .001) political 
participation.   
In order to delve more deeply into the relationships, a one-way ANOVA was 
executed to understand the differences among light and heavy binge-watchers with regard 
to online and offline political participation. To this end, an ordinal-level variable was 
created to capture binge-watching quantity (M = 1.611, SD = 1.355), using the number of 
programs that respondents reported having binge-watched in the month prior to 
completing the questionnaire. The binge-watching quantity variable resulted in 27.9% 
reported having not binged any programs in the past month, while 22.3% binged one 
program. 23.5% binged two, while 13.5% binged three programs. 12.8% binged four 
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programs or more.   
To execute the one-way ANOVA, the binge-watching quantity variable was set as 
the independent factor while both online and offline political participation served as the 
dependent variables. The one-way ANOVA produced statistically significant differences 
between groups, suggesting that those who binged more programs in the past month were 
more politically participatory online, Welch’s F(4, 210.48) = 12.27, p < .001, equal 
variances not assumed, and offline, Welch’s F(4, 212.60) = 7.91, p < .001, equal 
variances not assumed. More specifically, the estimated marginal means for both online 
and offline political participation levels steadily increased with higher quantities of 
binge-watching. These results are summarized in Figure 2.   
Figure 2. Estimated marginal means of offline and online political participation and the 
number of TV programs binged within past month. Offline and online political 
participation was measured on a scale from one (never) to four (always).   
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For online political participation, post-hoc comparisons (Games Howell) revealed 
statistically significant differences between the lowest (zero through one program) and 
highest (three and four or more programs) quantities of bingeing. More specifically, there 
were statistically significant differences between bingeing zero programs (M = .33, SD = 
.58), compared to two programs (M = .73, SD = .55), three programs (M = .80, SD = 
.84), and four or more programs (M = 1.04, SD = 1.11).  Additionally, bingeing one 
program (M = .41, SD = .55) resulted in statistically significant differences in online 
political participation when compared with two programs (M = .73, SD = .55), three 
programs (M = .80, SD = .84), and four or more programs (M = .80, SD = .84). 
However, comparing those who binged two, three, and four or more programs in the past 
month did not produce statistically significant differences.  
Post-hoc comparisons (Games Howell) for offline political participation revealed 
a similar pattern; there were statistically significant differences between the lowest and 
highest quantities of bingeing. Specifically, there were statistically significant differences 
between bingers of zero programs (M = .71, SD = .62) and two programs (M =1.00, SD 
= .80), three programs (M = 1.13, SD = .88), and four or more programs (M = 1.25, SD 
= 1.01).  Moreover, there were statistically significant differences between those who 
binged one program (M = .77, SD = .62) and two (M = 1.00, SD = .80), three (M = 1.13, 
SD = .88), and four or more (M = 1.25, SD = 1.01). However, comparing those who 
binged zero and one program, comparing those who binged two programs, three 
programs, or four or more programs, did not produce statistically significant differences.    
Turning to RQ2a - b regarding the genre of programs binged and both online and 
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offline political participation, respondents shared the frequency with which they viewed 
each specific genre when binge-watching on a scale of one (never) to five (sometimes) to 
ten (always). A bivariate correlation suggests all genres reflect positive, statistically 
significant relationships at the p <.01 level with online and offline political participation.  
These correlations suggest that the relationship between political participation and binge-
watching television is genre agnostic. These findings, though showing only weak but 
statistically significant relationships, generally reflect and replicate the results from the 
2016 study which served as the impetus for this dissertation (Groshek & Krongard, 
2016). That said, the strongest relationships were observed for the news and 
informational genre for both online (r = .440, p < 0.001) and offline (r = .420, p < 0.001) 
political participation. Table 1 details the correlation coefficients and significance values 
for online and offline political participation and frequency of bingeing different genres.  
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To delve more deeply into the topic of genre, a series of one-way ANOVAs were 
conducted to see whether there were differences in political participation among levels of 
genre viewership. Respondents were asked to share the frequency with which they 
consumed various genres while bingeing on a scale from one (never) to five (sometimes) 
to ten (always). For the purposes of these ANOVA tests, each of the following genre 
variables was transformed from the ten-point frequency scale to zero (low), one 
(medium), and two (high) scale. The original scale was transformed using zero through 
three as low, three through seven as medium and seven through ten as high. 
Descriptive statistics for the new low-medium-high genre variables are as follows: 
comedy (M = .52, SD = .69), political drama (M = .41, SD = .65), historical drama (M = 
.36, SD = .62), superhero drama (M = .44, SD = .69), crime drama (M = .68, SD = .79), 
Table 1. Pairwise correlations for frequency of bingeing different genres and political 
participation, online and offline. 
 
Genre Binged Online Participation Offline Participation 
 
Comedy .212*** .220*** 
Political Drama .322*** .334*** 
Historical Drama .325*** .346*** 
Superhero Drama .195*** .214*** 
Crime Drama .226*** .239*** 
Dramatic Comedy .197*** .227*** 
General Drama .236*** .207*** 
Action and Adventure .238*** .240*** 
Science-Fiction .246*** .226*** 
Horror .206*** .201*** 
Thriller .249*** .231*** 
News and Informational .440*** .420*** 
Sports .311*** .301*** 
Reality  .229*** .196*** 
Other .187*** .156*** 
Note: N = 378, Pearson’s r reported with pairwise deletion; *** p < 0.001. 
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dramatic comedy (M = .67, SD = .76), general drama (M = .48, SD = .70), action and 
adventure (M = .56, SD = .72), science fiction (M = .60, SD = .76), horror (M = .61, SD 
= .79), thriller (M = .55, SD = .75), news and informational (M = .45, SD = .70), sports 
(M = .38, SD = .68), reality, (M = .57, SD = .75), and other (M =.23, SD = .55). 
 Each ANOVA used the new low-medium-high genre variable as the independent factor, 
and the online and offline political participation variables served as the dependent 
variables within each model. The series of one-way ANOVAs demonstrated statistically 
significant differences among all genres, suggesting overall that consuming higher levels 
of any genre related with greater political participation, online and offline.  This finding 
reinforces the idea that the relationship here is genre agnostic.  
More specifically, with regard to online political participation, there were 
statistically significant differences among the levels of viewership for the following: 
comedy, Welch’s F(2, 97.66) = 6.52, p < .01, equal variances not assumed; political 
drama, Welch’s F(2, 71) = 13.38, p <.001, equal variances not assumed; historical drama, 
Welch’s F(2, 62.62) = 15.28, p < .001, equal variances not assumed; superhero drama, 
Welch’s F(2, 86.89) = .544, p <.01, equal variances not assumed, crime drama, Welch’s 
F(2, 375) = 11.62, p < .001, equal variances not assumed, dramatic comedy, Welch’s 
F(2, 206.35) = 9.06, p < .001, equal variances not assumed; general drama, Welch’s F(2, 
94.82) = 6.94, p < .01, equal variances not assumed; action and adventure, Welch’s F(2, 
110.90) = 8.10, p < .01, equal variances not assumed; science fiction, Welch’s F(2, 
134.40) = 9.77, p < .001, equal variances not assumed; horror, Welch’s F(2, 143.73) = 
7.20, p < .01, equal variances not assumed; thriller, Welch’s F(2, 118.10) = 9.16, p < 
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.001, equal variances not assumed; news and informational, Welch’s F(2, 89.16) = 24.73, 
p < .001, equal variances not assumed; sports, Welch’s F(2, 74.06) = 14.79, p < .001, 
equal variances not assumed; and reality, Welch’s F(2, 133.09) = 7.23, p < .01, equal 
variances not assumed.  Results are summarized in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3. Estimated marginal means of online political participation and the frequency of 
viewing specific genres when bingeing. Online political participation was measured on a 
scale from zero (never) to four (always).  Bingeing frequency was categorized as zero (low) to 
three (high). 
As Figure 3 reflects, all genres, except for crime drama, dramatic comedy, and 
other, resulted in an overall upward trend, suggesting that the more time spent bingeing 
each of these genres related with increased online political participation.  The genre 
categories of crime drama, dramatic comedy, and other each revealed a drop between 
medium and high bingers; these genres were examined in more depth to understand this 
pattern. 
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Post-hoc comparisons (Games Howell) for crime drama reveal a statistically 
significant difference with regard to online political participation when comparing low 
frequency bingeing (M = .4931, SD = .69) with both medium (M = .94, SD = .94) and 
high (M = .91, SD = .93). However, there were no statistically significant differences 
when comparing medium with high frequency bingeing of crime drama. In looking at 
dramatic comedy, post-hoc comparisons (Games Howell) revealed statistically significant 
differences in online political participation when comparing low (M = .52, SD = .70) and 
medium frequency (M = .91, SD = .91) bingeing, but high frequency (M = .82, SD = .98) 
bingeing was not statistically significant comparison to neither low nor medium. 
In order to delve more deeply into genre differences, post-hoc comparisons 
(Tukey HSD and Games Howell) were examined. With regard to comedy, post-hoc 
comparisons (Games Howell) suggests statistically significant differences in online 
political participation when comparing low frequency bingeing (M = .56, SD = .60) with 
both medium (M = .88, SD = .99) and high levels (M = .96, SD = 1.02), but no 
statistically significant differences between medium and high, despite the steady incline.  
Turning to offline political participation, there were statistically significant 
differences among the levels of viewership for the following genres: comedy, Welch’s 
F(2, 106.04) = 6.18, p < .01, equal variances not assumed; political drama, Welch’s F(2, 
73.83) = 15.19, p < .001, equal variances not assumed; historical drama, Welch’s F(2, 
64.19 = 16.50, p < .001, equal variances not assumed; superhero drama, Welch’s F(2, 
89.15 = 6.80, p < .01, equal variances not assumed; crime drama, Welch’s F(2, 375) = 
7.69, p < .001, equal variances not assumed; dramatic comedy Welch’s F(2, 157.95) = 
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9.46, p < .001, equal variances not assumed; action and adventure Welch’s F(2, 113.34) 
= 7.81, p < .01, equal variances not assumed; science fiction, Welch’s F(2, 141.40) = 
8.78, p < .001, equal variances not assumed; horror, F(2, 373) = 6.95, p < .01, equal 
variances not assumed; thriller, Welch’s F(2, 122.80 = 8.08, p < .01, equal variances not 
assumed; news and informational, Welch’s F(2, 92.31) = 23.73, p < .001, equal variances 
not assumed; sports, Welch’s F(2, 77.00) = 14.95, p < . 001, equal variances not 
assumed; reality, F(2, 375) = 7.75, p < .01, equal variances assumed; and other, F(2, 375) 
= 3.23, p < .05, equal variances assumed. More specifically, the estimated marginal 
means for offline political participation demonstrate a general upward trend. Results are 
summarized in Figure 4. 
Figure 4. Estimated marginal means of offline political participation and the frequency of 
viewing specific genres when bingeing. Offline political participation was measured on a 
scale from zero (never) to four (always).  Bingeing frequency was categorized as zero (low) to 
three (high). 
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Again, all genres move in a positive direction with regard to offline political 
participation, except for crime drama, dramatic comedy, science-fiction, and the genre 
category of other. Figure 3 suggests a similar pattern as the one depicted for online 
political participation, with the addition of science-fiction. For crime drama, again, post-
hoc comparisons (Games Howell) reveal statistically significant differences in offline 
political participation between low (M = .80, SD = .71) and medium (M = 1.25) 
frequency bingeing but no statistical significance when comparing these levels with high 
(M = 1.12, SD = .89) frequency bingeing.  
Looking at dramatic comedy, post-hoc comparisons (Games Howell) suggest 
again statistically significant differences in offline political participation when comparing 
low frequency bingeing (M = .83, SD = .71) with both medium (M = 1.12, SD = .85) and 
high (M = 1.18, SD = .97), but no statistically significant differences when comparing 
between medium and high.  Looking at science-fiction, post-hoc comparisons (Games 
Howell) suggest there were only statistically significant differences between low (M = 
.86, SD = .74) and high frequency (M = 1.37, SD = .92) bingeing with regard to offline 
political participation; neither level interacted statistically significantly with medium 
frequency (M = 1.06, SD = .86). Focusing now on the genre category of “other,” post-
hoc comparisons (Tukey HSD) reveal that there were statistically significant differences 
between low (M = .95, SD = .79) and medium (M = 1.28, SD = .97) frequency bingeing 
with regard to offline political participation. Comparisons with the high (M = 1.12, SD = 
.90) level of bingeing did not reveal any statistically significant differences. 
Analyses continued with hierarchical linear regression models for both online and 
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offline political participation which each considered the role of various pertinent 
independent variables. To this end, each model was built with five blocks, controlling for 
the following variables. Block one comprised demographics (gender, age, and income). 
Block two included variables related to politics (political ideology and political 
knowledge). Block three comprised empathy dimensions (empathic concern, perspective-
taking, fantasy, and personal distress). Block four included general media use (traditional 
television consumption, social media use, and non-traditional television consumption.  
Finally, block five consisted of binge behavior (number of programs binged; frequency of 
bingeing genres: comedy, political drama, historical drama, superhero drama, crime 
drama, dramatic comedy, general drama, action and adventure, science fiction, horror, 
thriller, news and informational, sports, reality, and other; and frequency of talking about 
binged TV). Political engagement variables that were strongly related theoretically to the 
dependent variables were not included in the model to avoid redundancy.  
First, online political participation was set as the dependent variable. The 
hierarchical linear regression suggests that the number of programs binged within the past 
month proved to be a statistically significant predictor of online political participation (B 
= .058, SE =.024, p < .05), although with a relatively modest effect on the model when 
comparing standardized Beta values (β = .129), thereby offering additional support for 
H1a. In other words, this finding suggests that with each additional program binged, there 
is a .058 increase in engaging in political activities offline (p < .05). Turning to genre and 
RQ2a, the frequency of binge-watching news and informational programming proved to 
be a statistically significant predictor of online political participation (B = .083, SE =.017, 
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p < .001) with the most substantial effect on the model (β = .309).  Here, with every one 
increase in the frequency level of bingeing news and informational programming, there is 
a .083 increase in online political participation (p < .001). 
This dissertation also examines the role of discussing the TV shows binged, in 
answering RQ6a which inquired as to the role of talking about television in online 
political participation. This model indicates that the frequency of discussing the programs 
binged proved to be a statistically significant (B = .196, SE =.051, p < .001) predictor for 
online political participation with relatively strong effect on the full model (β = .220). 
With every one increase in the frequency level of discussing binged TV programs, there 
is a robust .196 increase in online political participation (p < .001). Overall, the binge-
behavior block resulted in a statistically significant R-square change (ΔR2 = .139, p < 
.001), and the full model explained 39.3% of the variance, according to the adjusted R2.  
Results are detailed in Table 2. 
Table 2:  Hierarchical Linear Regression of Online Political Participation 
 Coefficient (B) Standard Error Beta (β)  
Step 1: Demographics  
Gender (being female) .020 .104 .010 
Age -.004 .003 -.067 
Income .006 .041 .007 
ΔR2                                .041** 
Step 2: Politics 
Political Ideology Scale (v. liberal - v. 
conservative -.090*** .022 -.201 
Political Knowledge .031 .025 .067 
ΔR2                               .044*** 
Step 3: Empathy Dimensions 
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Empathic Concern Scale -.122 .082 -.096 
Perspective-Taking Scale .144 .083 .101 
Fantasy Scale .073 .073 .055 
Personal Distress Scale -.040 .057 -.035 
ΔR2                               .028* 
 Step 4: General Media Use 
Traditional TV Consumption .027* .010 .140 
Social Media Use .003 .012 .017 
Nontraditional TV Consumption .006 .004 .117 
ΔR2                              .141*** 
Step 5: Binge Behavior 
Programs Binged in Past Month .058* .024 .129 
Frequency of Bingeing Comedy -.013 .016 -.045 
Frequency of Bingeing Political Drama .018 .020 .061 
Frequency of Bingeing Historical Drama .012 .022 .037 
Frequency of Bingeing Superhero Drama -.001 .017 -.003 
Frequency of Bingeing Crime Drama -.010 .016 -.038 
Frequency of Bingeing Dramatic Comedy -.013 .016 -.052 
Frequency of Bingeing General Drama -.015 .016 -.055 
Frequency of Bingeing Action - Adventure .006 .019 .024 
Frequency of Bingeing Sci-Fi -.009 .017 -.033 
Frequency of Bingeing Horror -.019 .015 -.078 
Frequency of Bingeing Thriller .010 .017 .038 
Frequency of Bingeing News .083*** .017 .309 
Frequency of Bingeing Sports -.015 .015 -.055 
Frequency of Bingeing Reality -.009 .015 -.036 
Frequency of Bingeing Other .012 .016 .036 
Frequency of Talking about Binged TV .196*** .051 .220 
ΔR2                               .139*** 
 Notes: N = 340, listwise deletion; overall Adjusted R2 = .393; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.10; 
*** p < 0.001. 
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In the second model, offline political participation was set as the dependent 
variable. Similar to the model for online political participation, this hierarchical linear 
regression suggests that the number of programs binged within the past month proved to 
be a statistically significant predictor of offline political participation (B = .050, SE 
=.024, p < .05), although with a relatively modest effect on the model (β = .114), offering 
additional support for H1b.  In other words, with each additional program binged, there is 
a .050 increase in engaging in political activities offline (p < .05).  
Turning to genre and RQ2b, the frequency of binge-watching news and 
informational programming proved to be a statistically significant predictor of offline 
political engagement (B = .079, SE =.016, p < .001), serving as the variable with the 
largest effect on the model when comparing standardized Betas (β = .303). Here, with 
every one increase in the frequency level of bingeing news and informational 
programming, there is a .079 increase in offline political engagement (p < .001).   
Again, with regard to talking about binge-watched programs and RQ6b, the frequency of 
discussing the programs binged also proved statistically significant (B = .194, SE =.050, 
p < .001) with relatively substantial effect on the full model (β = .225). With every one 
increase in the frequency level of discussing binged TV programs, there is a .194 increase 
in offline political engagement (p < .001).  
Unlike in the first model, this regression model reveals that the perspective-taking 
dimension of empathy served as a statistically significant predictor of offline political 
participation (B = .185, SE = .081, p < .05) with relatively moderate effect on the full 
model (β = .135). For every one increase in level of perspective-taking, there is a .185 
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increase in offline political participation (p < .05).   
The models for both online and offline political participation suggest that political 
ideology is a statistically significant predictor of participation. With regard to online 
engagement, political ideology (B = -.090, SE = .022, p < .001) had a relatively weak to 
moderate effect on the model (β = -.135); every one level closer to very liberal results in 
a .135 increase in online political engagement. For offline engagement, political ideology 
(B = -.094, SE = .021, p < .001) had a stronger effect on the full model (β = -.216), 
suggesting that for every one level closer to very liberal results in a .094 increase in 
offline political engagement.  
Looking at the full model, the binge-behavior block resulted in a statistically 
significant R-square change (ΔR2 = .144, p < .001), and the full model explained 32.3% 
of the variance, according to the adjusted R2.  Results are detailed in Table 3. 
Table 3: Hierarchical Linear Regression of Offline Political Participation 
 Coefficient (B) Standard Error Beta (β) 
Step 1: Demographics  
Gender (being female) .051 .102 .025 
Age -.001 .003 -.020 
Income .074 .040 .091 
ΔR2                                .052*** 
Step 2: Politics 
Political Ideology Scale (v. liberal – v. 
conservative -.094*** .021 -.216 
Political Knowledge .013 .025 .029 
ΔR2                               .047*** 
Step 3: Empathy Dimensions 
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Empathic Concern Scale -.088 .080 -.071 
Perspective-Taking Scale .185* .081 .135 
Fantasy Scale .054 .072 .041 
Personal Distress Scale -.083 .056 -.074 
ΔR2                               .031* 
 Step 4: General Media Use 
Traditional TV Consumption .017 .010 .090 
Social Media Use -.005 -.012 -.026 
Nontraditional TV Consumption .007 .004 .132 
ΔR2                              .108*** 
Step 5: Binge Behavior 
Programs Binged in the Past Month .050* .024 .114 
Frequency of Bingeing Comedy -.010 .016 -.038 
Frequency of Bingeing Political Drama .016 .020 .057 
Frequency of Bingeing Historical Drama .025 .021 .082 
Frequency of Bingeing Superhero Drama .004 .017 .017 
Frequency of Bingeing Crime Drama -.009 .016 -.034 
Frequency of Bingeing Dramatic Comedy .006 .016 .024 
Frequency of Bingeing General Drama -.025 .016 -.097 
Frequency of Bingeing Action - Adventure .017 .019 .063 
Frequency of Bingeing Sci-Fi -.020 .016 -.079 
Frequency of Bingeing Horror -.018 .015 -.074 
Frequency of Bingeing Thriller .001 .017 .006 
Frequency of Bingeing News .079*** .016 .303 
Frequency of Bingeing Sports -.015 .017 -.057 
Frequency of Bingeing Reality -.013 .014 -.054 
Frequency of Bingeing Other .006 .016 .018 
Frequency of Talking about Binged TV .194*** .050 .225 
ΔR2                               .144*** 
Notes: N = 340, listwise deletion; overall Adjusted R2 = .323; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.10; *** 
p < 0.001. 
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Binge-watching and political talk. 
With regard to the topic of political talk, a bivariate correlation demonstrates 
positive, statistically significant relationships between binge-watching and talking 
politics both online (r = .321, p < 0.001) and offline (r = .284, p < 0.001), suggesting 
support for H2a - b which asserted that increased time binge-watching television will be 
positively related to online and offline political talk. 
Again, the binge-watch quantity variable described above was used as the 
independent factor in a one-way ANOVA, where online and offline political talk served 
as the dependent variables. Results demonstrate statistically significant differences, 
suggesting that those who binge more television programs also engage in greater political 
talk both online, Welch’s F(4, 205.95) = 16.90, p < .001, equal variances not assumed, 
and offline, F(4, 510) = 11.19, p < .001, equal variances assumed. Examining the 
estimated marginal means for both online and offline political talk revealed a similar 
pattern as the political engagement variable described above; generally, there was a 
steady positive increase in political talk as the amount of binge-watching increased.  
Results are summarized in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. Estimated marginal means of online and offline political talk and the number of 
programs. The frequency of engaging in online and offline political talk, as well as talking 
about binge-watched TV programs, were measured on a scale of one (never) to five (always).   
 
To explore differences in more depth, post-hoc comparisons (Tukey HSD and 
Games Howell) were examined. With regard to talking politics online, post-hoc 
comparisons (Games Howell) revealed statistically significant differences among those 
who binged zero programs (M = 1.66, SD = .81) in comparison with one program (M = 
2.01, SD = .97), two programs (M = 2.12, SD = 1.03), three programs (M = 2.59, SD = 
1.06), and four or more programs (M = 2.71, SD = 1.20). Actually, there were 
statistically significant differences when comparing each of these levels of bingeing, 
except for when comparing one program (M = 2.01, SD = .97) with two programs (M = 
2.12, SD = 1.03), and comparing three programs (M = 2.59, SD = 1.06) with four or 
more programs (M = 2.71, SD = 1.20).  All other permutations of comparisons revealed 
statistically significant differences in the frequency of talking politics online. 
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Turning to talking politics offline, post-hoc comparisons (Tukey HSD) revealed a 
pattern where comparisons between the lowest and highest quantities of bingeing 
revealed significant differences. More specifically, there were significant differences 
between those who binged zero programs (M = 2.03, SD = .82) and those who binged 
two programs (M = 2.40, SD = .88), three programs (M = 2.62, SD = .98), and four or 
more programs (M = 2.83, SD = .98). Additionally, there were significant differences 
between those who binged four or more programs (M = 2.83, SD = .98) and those who 
binged one program (M = 2.23, SD = .90) or two programs (M = 2.40, SD = .88).  
However, no significant differences emerged when comparing zero and one program or 
three and four or more.  
Similarly, for RQ3a – b, which inquired as to the genres consumed and political 
talk, correlational findings suggest that all genres again demonstrate positive, significant 
relationships at the p <.01 level with regard to talking politics online and offline.  Please 
see Table 4 for a detailed account of correlations. Again, while these relationships are 
statistically significant, they are relatively weak, overall. The correlation proved slightly 
stronger for the news and informational genre for both talking politics online (r = .405, p 
< .001) and offline (r = .398, p < .001).  
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Another series of ANOVAs was conducted to examine differences in participation 
in political discourse among levels of genre viewership. Reflecting the procedure used in 
RQ2a-b, each ANOVA used the low-medium-high genre variable as the independent 
factor, but here, the variables that measured talking politics online and talking politics 
offline were used as the dependent variables. Again, results suggest there were 
statistically significant differences among the levels of viewership for political talk online 
and offline.   
 
Table 4. Pairwise correlations for frequency of bingeing different genres and political 
talk, online and offline. 
 
Genre Binged Online Political Talk Offline Political Talk 
 
Comedy .192*** .227*** 
Political Drama .304*** .314*** 
Historical Drama .313*** .338*** 
Superhero Drama .174*** .314*** 
Crime Drama .274*** .296*** 
Dramatic Comedy .159*** .194*** 
General Drama .195*** .201*** 
Action and Adventure .259*** .232*** 
Science-Fiction .321*** .317*** 
Horror .355*** .310*** 
Thriller .275*** .265*** 
News and Informational .405*** .398*** 
Sports .328*** .319*** 
Reality  .222*** .186*** 
Other .181*** .178*** 
Note: N = 378, Pearson’s r reported with pairwise deletion; *** p < 0.001. 
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Looking first at talking politics online, there were statistically significant 
differences among levels of viewership for the following genres: comedy, F(2, 363) = 
5.75, p < .01, equal variances assumed; political drama F(2, 363) = 16.26, p <.001, equal 
variances assumed; historical drama, F(2, 363) = 16.33, p < .001, equal variances 
assumed; superhero drama [F(2, 363) = 4.67, p < .001, equal variances assumed; crime, 
F(2, 363) = 11.40, p <.001, equal variances assumed; dramatic comedy, F(2, 363) = 5.52, 
p < .01, equal variances assumed; general drama, F(2, 363) = 5.33, p < .01, equal 
variances assumed; action and adventure, F(2, 363) = 11.14, p < .001, equal variances 
assumed; science fiction, F(2, 363) = 18.31, p < .001, equal variances assumed; horror, 
F(2, 363) = 21.73, p < .001, equal variances assumed; thriller, F(2, 363) = 13.39, p < 
.001, equal variances assumed; news and informational, F(2, 363) = 36.15, p < .001, 
equal variances assumed; sports, F(2, 363) = 18.54, p < .001, equal variances assumed; 
reality, and other, F(2, 363) = 3.87, p < .05, equal variances assumed.  
Examining the patterns more closely, the estimated marginal means reveal a 
general upward trend. The only genre to reveal a negative shift was dramatic comedy.  
Post-hoc comparisons (Tukey HSD) suggest statistically significant differences in online 
political talk between low (M = .21, SD = 1.02) and medium (M = 2.50, SD = 1.10) 
frequency binge-watching but no statistically significant differences when comparing 
with high (M = 2.40, SD = 1.21) frequency. Results are summarized in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6. Estimated marginal means of online political talk and the frequency of viewing 
specific genres when bingeing. Online political talk was measured on a scale from zero 
(never) to five (always).  Bingeing frequency was categorized as zero (low) to three (high). 
 
Turning to talking politics offline, there were statistically significant differences 
among levels of viewership for the following genres: comedy, F(2, 371) = 9.73, p < .001, 
equal variances assumed; political drama, F(2, 371) = 18.68, p < .001, equal variances 
assumed; historical drama, Welch’s F(2, 69.96) = 22.87, p < .001, equal variances not 
assumed; superhero drama, F(2, 371) = 7.81, p < .001, equal variances assumed; crime 
drama, F(2, 12.45) = 15.02, p < .001, equal variances assumed; dramatic comedy, F(2, 
375) = 9.12, p < .001, equal variances assumed; general drama, F(2, 371) = 7.44, p < .01, 
equal variances assumed; action and adventure, F(2, 371) = 15.44, p < .001, equal 
variances assumed; science fiction, F(2, 371) = 18.70, p < .001, equal variances assumed; 
horror, F(2, 371) = 17.49, p < .001, equal variances assumed; thriller, F(2, 371) = 12.80, 
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p < .001, equal variances assumed; news and informational, F(2, 371) = 24.26, p < .001, 
equal variances assumed; sports, F(2, 371) = 19.03, p < .001, equal variances assumed; 
reality, F(2, 371) = 6.01, p < . 01, equal variances assumed; and other, F(2, 371) = 5.31, p 
< .01, equal variances assumed. 
More specifically, the estimated marginal means reveal a general upward trend for 
all genres except for dramatic comedy and the genre category of “other.” Again, post-hoc 
comparisons (Tukey HSD) for dramatic comedy reveal that there are statistically 
significant differences in talking politics offline between low frequency (M = 2.29, SD = 
.92) bingeing and both medium (M = 2.74, SD = .84) and high (M = 2.60, SD = 1.06).  
However, there was no statistically significant difference between medium and high 
frequency bingeing. Looking now at the genre category of “other”, post-hoc comparisons 
(Tukey HSD) revealed statistically significant differences between low (M = .2.41, SD = 
.92) and medium (M = .29, SD = .86) frequency bingeing, but there were no statistically 
significant differences when comparing either with high (M = 2.79, SD = 1.22) 
frequency bingeing.  Results are summarized in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7. Estimated marginal means of offline political talk and the frequency of viewing 
specific genres when bingeing. Offline political talk was measured on a scale from zero 
(never) to five (always).  Bingeing frequency was categorized as zero (low) to three (high). 
 
Analyses continued with hierarchical linear regression models for both online and 
offline political talk, examining the role of various pertinent independent variables. 
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included binge behavior (number of programs binged; frequency of bingeing genres: 
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informational, sports, reality, and other; and frequency of talking about binged TV). 
Again, political engagement variables that were strongly related theoretically to the 
dependent variables were not included in the model to avoid redundancy.  
Similar results emerged when investigating the two talking about politics 
variables.  First, in examining the variable of talking politics online as the dependent 
variable, the model did not suggest support for H2a; in other words, the model suggests 
that the number of programs binged is not a statistically significant predictor of online 
political talk.  
However, more compelling results emerged when looking at genre, with regard to 
RQ3a. Here, the model suggests that dramatic comedy (B = -.040, SE = .020, p < .05), 
horror (B = .049, SE = .019, p < .01), and news and informational (B = .062, SE = .020, 
p < .01) genres each are statistically significant predictors of participating in civic 
discourse online.  Each genre had a similar moderate effect on the model when 
comparing standardized Betas: dramatic comedy (β = -.125), horror (β = .160), and news 
and informational (β = .184). Curiously, dramatic comedy had a negative impact, 
suggesting that for every one frequency level of bingeing dramatic comedy, online 
political talk decreases by .040 (p < .05), where horror as well as news and informational 
both were positively related genres.  For every one frequency level of bingeing horror, 
online political talk increases by .049 (p < .01), and for every one frequency level of 
bingeing news and information programming, online political talk increases by .062 (p < 
.01).  
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Again, the variable of talking about the TV binged proved to be a statistically 
significant (B = .393, SE =.061, p < .001) predictor of talking politics online, with the 
strongest effect on the full model when comparing standardized betas (β = .437). With 
every one increase in the frequency level of discussing binged TV, there is a substantial 
.393 increase in online political participation (p < .001). 
An additional statistically significant predictor of talking politics online was 
political ideology (B = -.068, SE = .026, p < .01), which revealed a similar pattern as 
with online and offline political participation.  Political ideology had a relatively modest 
effect on the model (β = -.121); every one level closer to very liberal resulted in a .068 
increase in online political participation (p < .01).  Furthermore, the variable of social 
media use was a statistically significant (B = .020, SE = .015, p < .05) predictor of 
talking politics online, and when comparing standardized Betas, revealed a relatively 
moderate effect on the full model (β = .124). 
Ultimately, the binge-behavior block resulted in a statistically significant R-
square change (ΔR2 = .253, p < .001), and the full model explained 47.5% of the variance, 
according to the adjusted R2.  Results are summarized in Table 5. 
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Table 5: Hierarchical Linear Regression of Online Political Talk 
 Coefficient (B) Standard Error Beta (β)  
Step 1: Demographics  
Gender (being female) -.125 .126 -.048 
Age .001 .004 .020 
Income -.016 .048 -.015 
ΔR2                                .048** 
Step 2: Politics 
Political Ideology Scale (v. liberal - v. 
conservative -.068** .026 -.121 
Political Knowledge .036 .030 .061 
ΔR2                               .031** 
Step 3: Empathy Dimensions 
Empathic Concern Scale -.032 .099 -.020 
Perspective-Taking Scale .126 .098 .070 
Fantasy Scale .073 .087 .043 
Personal Distress Scale .010 .069 .007 
ΔR2                               .044** 
 Step 4: General Media Use 
Traditional TV Consumption -.001 .012 -.005 
Social Media Use .020* .015 .124 
Nontraditional TV Consumption .000 .005 .002 
ΔR2                              .100*** 
Step 5: Binge Behavior 
Programs Binged in the Past Month .036 .030 .059 
Frequency of Bingeing Comedy -.023 .019 -.065 
Frequency of Bingeing Political Drama .017 .024 .048 
Frequency of Bingeing Historical Drama -.001 .026 -.001 
Frequency of Bingeing Superhero Drama -.004 .021 -.010 
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Frequency of Bingeing Crime Drama .009 .019 .027 
Frequency of Bingeing Dramatic Comedy -.040* .020 -.125 
Frequency of Bingeing General Drama -.018 .019 -.054 
Frequency of Bingeing Action - Adventure .012 .023 .034 
Frequency of Bingeing Sci-Fi .007 .020 .021 
Frequency of Bingeing Horror .049** .019 .160 
Frequency of Bingeing Thriller -.023 .01821 -.069 
Frequency of Bingeing News .062** .020 .184 
Frequency of Bingeing Sports .004 .021 .013 
Frequency of Bingeing Reality -.007 .018 -.022 
Frequency of Bingeing Other .023 .019 .056 
Frequency of Talking about Binged TV .393*** .061 .437 
ΔR2                               .253*** 
Notes: N = 329, listwise deletion; overall Adjusted R2 = .475; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.10; *** 
p < 0.001. 
  
The next hierarchical linear regression model examined the dependent variable of 
talking politics offline. Results closely reflected those of the talking politics online 
variable, with some variation. First, similar to the previous regression, this model does 
not suggest support for H2b which asserted that the amount of binge-watching television 
will be positively related to offline political talk. The quantity of programs binge-watched 
did not serve as a statistically significant predictor of talking politics offline.  
Turning to the issue of genre with RQ3b, a similar pattern as the political participation 
variables emerged. This regression model suggests that the frequency of bingeing news 
and informational programming (B = .050, SE = .017, p < .01) were statistically 
significant predictors of participating in civic discourse online. This genre had a 
relatively moderate effect when comparing standardized Betas: (β = .171). 
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Again, the variable of talking television binged proved to be a statistically 
significant (B = .399, SE =.053, p < .001) predictor of talking politics offline, with the 
strongest effect on the full model (β = .410). With every one increase in the frequency 
level of discussing binged TV, there is a .399 increase in offline political participation (p 
< .001). 
Political ideology proved to be a statistically significant predictor of talking 
politics offline (B = -.065, SE = .022, p < .01), which revealed a similar pattern as the 
online and offline political participation variables. Political ideology had a relatively 
moderate effect on the model (β = -.134); every one level closer to very liberal results in 
a .065 increase in offline political talk (p < .01). Additionally, political knowledge served 
as a statistically significant predictor of talking politics offline (B = .061, SE = .026, p < 
.05), with a similarly moderate effect on the full model (β = -.134).  
Again, the binge-behavior block resulted in a statistically significant R-square 
change (ΔR2 = .220, p < .001), and the full model explained 39.6% of the variance, 
according to the adjusted R2.  Results are summarized in Table 6. 
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Table 6:  Hierarchical Linear Regression of Offline Political Talk 
 Coefficient B Standard Error Beta β  
Step 1: Demographics  
Gender (being female) -.070 .004 -.031 
Age -.001 .004 -.013 
Income .009 .042 .009 
ΔR2                                .046*** 
Step 2: Politics 
Political Ideology Scale (v. liberal - v. 
conservative -.065** .022 -.134 
Political Knowledge .061* .026 .119 
ΔR2                                 .049*** 
Step 3: Empathy Dimensions 
Empathic Concern Scale .021 .085 .015 
Perspective-Taking Scale .146 .086 .095 
Fantasy Scale .103 .077 .071 
Personal Distress Scale -.102 .060 -.081 
ΔR2                                   .057* 
 Step 4: General Media Use 
Traditional TV Consumption .014 .0101 .068 
Social Media Use .008 .013 .039 
Nontraditional TV Consumption -.002 .004 -.028 
ΔR2                                   .077*** 
Step 5: Binge Behavior 
Programs Binged in the Past Month .042 .025 .085 
Frequency of Bingeing Comedy -.001 .017 -.003 
Frequency of Bingeing Political Drama .008 .021 .024 
Frequency of Bingeing Historical Drama .008 .023 .024 
Frequency of Bingeing Superhero Drama .016 .019 .051 
Frequency of Bingeing Crime Drama .009 .017 .034 
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Frequency of Bingeing Dramatic Comedy -.014 .017 -.050 
Frequency of Bingeing General Drama -.020 .017 -.067 
Frequency of Bingeing Action - Adventure -.011 .020 -.035 
Frequency of Bingeing Sci-Fi .010 .017 .034 
Frequency of Bingeing Horror .020 .016 .076 
Frequency of Bingeing Thriller -.005 .018 -.018 
Frequency of Bingeing News .050** .017 .171 
Frequency of Bingeing Sports .005 .018 .016 
Frequency of Bingeing Reality -.016 .015 -.058 
Frequency of Bingeing Other .021 .017 .059 
Frequency of Talking about Binged TV .399*** .053 .410 
ΔR2                                    .220*** 
Notes: N = 338, listwise deletion; overall Adjusted R2 = .396; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.10; *** 
p < 0.001. 
Dimensions of empathy. 
To explore RQ4a - d, this dissertation investigates the ways in which various 
dimensions of empathy relate with binge-watching. First, relationships were examined 
from a correlational perspective. There were statistically significant relationships between 
the quantity of binge-watching and empathic concern (r = -.107, p < .05), fantasy (r = 
.196, p < .001), and personal distress (r = 165, p < .001). Here, findings suggest that 
empathic concern related negatively with binge-watching while the self-oriented 
dimension of empathy, personal distress, related positively. Perspective-taking did not 
demonstrate a statistically significant correlation.  
A one-way ANOVA was executed to look generally at the quantity of binge-
watching as it relates to the various dimensions of empathy. The recoded ordinal-level 
variable that captured the number of programs respondents consumed in the month prior 
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to completing the survey was used as the independent factor while the empathy 
dimensions (empathic concern, perspective-taking, fantasy, and personal distress) were 
set as the dependent variables. Results revealed statistically significant differences among 
the levels of binge-watching with regard to two of the empathy dimensions: personal 
distress, F(4, 519) = 3.134, p < .05, equal variances assumed, and fantasy, F(4, 519) = 
7.586, p < .001, equal variances assumed. The estimated marginal means reveal a fairly 
steady incline for both dimensions of empathy. Figure 8 details the results.  
Figure 8. Estimated marginal means of the statistically significant empathy dimensions and 
the number of TV programs binged within past month. Empathy dimensions were 
measured on a scale of one (does not describe me at all) to five (describes me very well). 
 Turning to genre, correlational analyses reveals that the only statistically 
significant relationship with perspective-taking was action and adventure (r = -.160, p < 
.01), suggesting that those who spend more time binge-watching action and adventure 
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concern, the following genres resulted in statistically significant, negative correlations: 
comedy (r = -.133, p < .01), political drama (r = -.156, p < .01), superhero drama (r = -
.129, p < .05), action and adventure ( r = -.240, p < .01), horror (r = -.108, p < .05), 
thriller (r = -.141, p < .01), and news and informational (r = -.126, p < .05). Thus, the 
more frequent consumption of these genres, the lower the levels of empathic concern.  
The fantasy dimension of empathy correlated statistically significantly with the following 
genres: crime drama (r = .126, p < .05), dramatic comedy (r = .163, p < .01), general 
drama (r = .114, p < .05), science fiction (r = .155, p < .01), and reality (r = .124, p < 
.05). Here, it seems that the more time spent binge-watching the genres listed above, the 
higher the levels of fantasy-based empathy, although each of the correlations is weak. 
Personal distress revealed statistically significant relationships with the following 
genres: dramatic comedy (r = .142, p < .01), general drama (r = .127, p < .05), reality 
programming (r = .139, p < .01), and other (r = .126, p < .05). To delve more deeply 
into these findings and provide a more granular understanding of relationships to genre, a 
series of ANOVAs were executed, examining differences in empathy among levels of 
genre viewership. Each ANOVA used the low-medium-high frequency bingeing variable 
for each genre, described previously, as the independent factor, and the empathy 
dimensions were used as the dependent variables.   
Focusing first on perspective-taking, a series of one-way ANOVA revealed 
statistically significant differences among the levels of binge-watching for the genres of 
action and adventure, F(2, 375) = 5.796, p < .01, equal variances assumed, and thriller 
F(2, 375) = 1.316, p < .05, equal variances assumed. An examination of estimated 
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marginal means suggests that low and high frequency consumers of both genres show 
higher levels of perspective-taking than medium-frequency viewers. Post-hoc tests 
(Tukey HSD) for action and adventure demonstrated statistically significant differences 
when comparing low (M = 3.61, SD = .61) and medium (M = 3.4, SD = .62) frequency 
viewership but not when comparing either with high (M = 3.39, SD = .53). Post-hoc tests 
(Tukey HSD) for the thriller genre suggested statistically significant differences between 
low (M = 3.56, SD = .63) and medium (M = 3.37, SD = .53) but not when comparing 
either with high (M = 3.59, SD = .59). The pattern suggests that low and high frequency 
binge-watchers demonstrated higher levels of perspective-taking than medium frequency 
bingers. Figure 9 summarizes the results. 
Figure 9. Estimated marginal means of level of perspective-taking and viewing specific 
genres when bingeing. Perspective-taking was measured on a scale of one (does not describe 
me at all) to five (describes me very well). Bingeing frequency was categorized as zero (low) 
to three (high). 
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Next, a series of one-way ANOVAs revealed statistically significant differences 
among low, medium, and high frequency bingers of the following genres with regard to 
levels of empathic concern: comedy, F(2, 375) = 4.048, p < .05, equal variances 
assumed; historical drama, F(2, 375) = 5.015, p < .01, equal variances assumed; 
superhero drama, F(2, 375) = 4.052, p < .05, equal variances assumed; crime drama, F(2, 
375) = 3.240, p < .05, equal variances assumed; action and adventure, F(2, 375) = 
12.630, p < .001, equal variances assumed; science fiction, F(2, 375) = 3.381, p < .05, 
equal variances assumed; horror, F(2, 375) = 2.5411, p < .01, equal variances assumed; 
thriller, F(2, 375) = 4.162, p < .001, equal variances assumed; and sports, F(2, 375) = 
4.130, p < .01, equal variances assumed.  Results are illustrated in Figure 10. 
Figure 10. Estimated marginal means of level of empathic concern and viewing specific 
genres when bingeing. Empathic concern was measured on a scale of one (does not describe 
me at all) to five (describes me very well). Bingeing frequency was categorized as zero (low) 
to three (high). 
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As depicted within Figure 10, there seems to be a consistent pattern, where the 
low binge-watchers of all genres reveal higher levels of empathic concern.  However, the 
lowest levels of empathic concern seem to be not with the highest binge-watchers but 
with the medium-frequency viewers. The following outlines the post-hoc comparisons for 
additional detail. With regard to comedy, post-hoc comparisons (Tukey HSD) revealed 
statistically significant differences among low (M = 3.78, SD = .62) and medium (M = 
3.58, SD = .60) frequency bingers of comedy but not high (M = 3.57, SD = .67). Looking 
at historical dramas, Games Howell post hoc comparisons illustrated differences between 
low levels (M = 3.76, SD = 69) and both medium (M = 3.54, SD = .65) and high (M = 
3.48, SD = .48) levels of binge-watching but no statistically significant differences when 
comparing medium and high with one another. Post-hoc comparisons (Tukey HSD and 
Games Howell) suggested a fairly consistent pattern, where there are statistically 
significant differences between the low and medium and sometimes low and high 
frequency binge-watchers; however, there were rarely statistically significant differences 
among medium and high frequency bingeing.  
Next, the following genres proved to have statistically significant differences 
among low, medium, and high frequency binge-watching, with regard to level of fantasy-
based empathy: political drama, F(2, 375) = 3.104, p < .05, equal variances assumed; 
crime drama, F(2, 375) = 3.0450, p < .05, equal variances assumed; dramatic comedy, 
F(2, 375) = 5.223, p < .01, equal variances assumed; and science fiction, F(2, 375) = 
4.654, p < .05, equal variances assumed. In examining estimated marginal means, overall, 
fantasy seemed to increase as level of binge-watching increases.  However, this is not the 
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case for the genre of political drama; here the highest level of fantasy was among 
medium-frequency bingers. Post-hoc comparisons (Tukey HSD) reveal statistically 
significant differences among low (M = 3.25, SD = .68) and medium (M = 3.45, SD = 
.55) frequency bingers but neither were statistically significant when compared with high 
(M = 3.36, SD = .64) frequency bingers.  Results are summarized in Figure 11.   
Figure 11. Estimated marginal means of level of fantasy and viewing specific genres when 
bingeing. Fantasy was measured on a scale of one (does not describe me at all) to five 
(describes me very well). Bingeing frequency was categorized as zero (low) to three (high). 
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Here, results demonstrated a consistent pattern across all genres, where the more 
frequently the genre is consumed, the higher the level of personal distress. Figure 12 
summarizes the results.    
Figure 12. Estimated marginal means of level of personal distress and viewing specific 
genres when bingeing. Personal distress was measured on a scale of one (does not describe 
me at all) to five (describes me very well). Bingeing frequency was categorized as zero (low) 
to three (high). 
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comprised binge behavior (number of programs binged; frequency of bingeing genres: 
comedy, political drama, historical drama, superhero drama, crime drama, dramatic 
comedy, general drama, action and adventure, science fiction, horror, thriller, news and 
informational, sports, reality, and other; and frequency of talking about binged TV).  
The previous regression models used within this dissertation included two blocks 
deliberately omitted from the following empathy-focused regression models. The first is 
the block regarding empathy dimensions, which was removed because the ways in which 
various dimensions of empathy predict one another is not theoretically relevant to this 
dissertation.  Additionally, political engagement variables were omitted, as political 
participation and political discourse are not in question as potential predictors of 
empathy; rather, empathy measures were incorporated in previous models as the 
independent variables. Interrogating political engagement measures as potential 
independent variables within the empathy regression models is not in alignment with the 
scope or theoretical propositions of this study. Thus, the main purpose of the following 
empathy-focused regression models is to better understand the various dimensions in 
relation to binge-watching and binge-behavior.   
First, the dimension of perspective-taking was examined as the dependent 
variable, considering RQ4a. The regression model suggested that while the number of 
programs binged did not serve as a statistically significant predictor of perspective-
taking, more compelling findings emerged when considering genre. The frequency of 
bingeing action and adventure programming (B = -.057, SE = .016, p < .001) was a 
statistically significant predictor of perspective taking. This genre had a moderate and 
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negative effect when comparing standardized Betas: (β = -.292).  In other words, with 
every increased step in frequency of bingeing action and adventure television, the level of 
perspective-taking decreases .057.  
Additionally, age was a statistically significant predictor of perspective-taking (B 
= .008, SE = .033, p < .01), suggesting that with each increase in year of age, 
perspective-taking increases by .008, although with a relatively moderate effect on the 
full model (β = .195).  Finally, the variable of talking about television binged served as a 
statistically significant predictor (B = .102, SE = .041, p < .05), also with a somewhat 
moderate effect on the full model (β = .162).  Here it seems that with a one-level increase 
in talking about television shows binged results in a .102 increase in perspective-taking.  
The binge-behavior block resulted in a statistically significant R-square change (ΔR2 = 
.088, p < .05), and the full model explained a low 17.7% of the variance.  Details are 
reported within Table 7.  
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Table 7: Hierarchical Linear Regression of Perspective-Taking 
 Coefficient (B) Standard Error Beta (β)  
Step 1: Demographics  
Gender (being female) -.010 .084 -.007 
Age .008** .003 .195 
Income .039 .033 .065 
Political Ideology Scale (v. liberal - v. 
conservative .029 .018 .092 
ΔR2                                .034* 
Step 2: General Media Use 
Traditional TV Consumption -.017 .009 -.126 
Social Media Use .003 .010 .018 
Nontraditional TV Consumption -.002 .020 -.031 
ΔR2                               .012 
Step 3: Binge Behavior 
Programs Binged in the Past Month -.010 .020 -.031 
Frequency of Bingeing Comedy -.009 .013 -.048 
Frequency of Bingeing Political Drama .005 .017 .023 
Frequency of Bingeing Historical Drama -.007 .018 -.031 
Frequency of Bingeing Superhero Drama -.006 .014 -.030 
Frequency of Bingeing Crime Drama .020 .013 .111 
Frequency of Bingeing Dramatic Comedy .024 .014 .136 
Frequency of Bingeing General Drama .007 .014 .035 
Frequency of Bingeing Action - Adventure -.057*** .016 -.292 
Frequency of Bingeing Sci-Fi .008 .014 .046 
Frequency of Bingeing Horror .004 .013 .026 
Frequency of Bingeing Thriller -.008 .014 -.042 
Frequency of Bingeing News .014 .014 .072 
Frequency of Bingeing Sports .004 .015 .022 
Frequency of Bingeing Reality .008 .012 .044 
Frequency of Bingeing Other -.006 .014 -.024 
Frequency of Talking about Binged TV .102* .041 .162 
ΔR2                                 .088* 
Notes: N = 340, listwise deletion; overall Adjusted R2 = .177; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.10; *** 
p < 0.001. 
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Next, the dimension of empathic concern was examined as the dependent 
variable, turning to RQ4b. The regression model suggested that the same variables served 
as statistically significant predictors for empathy as for perspective-taking. The frequency 
of bingeing action and adventure (B = -.055, SE = .016, p < .01) was a statistically 
significant predictor of empathic concern, and again, this genre had a moderate-to-strong 
and negative effect when comparing standardized Betas: (β = -.254).  Put differently, with 
every increased step in the frequency of bingeing action and adventure TV, the level of 
empathic concern decreases .055, similar to perspective-taking.  
Again, age was a statistically significant predictor of empathic concern (B = .014, 
SE = .003, p < .001), suggesting that with each increase in year of age, empathic concern 
increases by .008. Unlike perspective-taking, age had a quite strong effect on the full 
model for empathy (β = .310). Also, the variable of talking about television binged served 
as a statistically significant predictor with empathy (B = .088, SE = .043, p < .05), with a 
moderate effect on the full model (β = .126); with a one-level increase in talking about 
television shows binged results in a .102 increase in perspective-taking. 
In contrast with perspective-taking, binge-watching the genre of crime drama (B 
= .033, SE = .014, p < .05) served as a statistically significant predictor of empathic 
concern, although the effect on the full model was limited (β = .166). Unlike action and 
adventure, crime drama was related positively. In other words, with every increased step 
in the frequency of bingeing crime drama, the level of empathic concern increases .033. 
The binge-behavior block produced a statistically significant R-square change (ΔR2 = 
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.093, p < .05), and the full model explained another low 17.7% of the variance, according 
to the adjusted R2.  Table 8 summarizes the model.   
Table 8:  Hierarchical Linear Regression of Empathic Concern 
 Coefficient (B) Standard Error Beta (β)  
Step 1: Demographics  
Gender (being female) .114 .088 .070 
Age .014*** .003 .310 
Income .055 .035 .083 
Political Ideology Scale (v. liberal - v. 
conservative .005 .019 .013 
ΔR2                                .117*** 
Step 2: General Media Use 
Traditional TV Consumption -.013 .009 -.084 
Social Media Use .000 .011 .002 
Nontraditional TV Consumption -.003 .004 -.073 
ΔR2                               .026* 
Step 3: Binge Behavior 
Programs Binged in the Past Month -.011 .021 -.030 
Frequency of Bingeing Comedy .005 .014 .021 
Frequency of Bingeing Political Drama .016 .018 .071 
Frequency of Bingeing Historical Drama -.036 .019 -.148 
Frequency of Bingeing Superhero Drama -.021 .015 -.096 
Frequency of Bingeing Crime Drama .033* .014 .166 
Frequency of Bingeing Dramatic Comedy .010 .014 .049 
Frequency of Bingeing General Drama -.005 .014 -.026 
Frequency of Bingeing Action - Adventure -.055** .016 -.254 
Frequency of Bingeing Sci-Fi .011 .014 .053 
Frequency of Bingeing Horror .002 .013 .011 
Frequency of Bingeing Thriller -.013 .015 -.063 
Frequency of Bingeing News .020 .014 .096 
Frequency of Bingeing Sports -.006 .015 -.030 
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Frequency of Bingeing Reality .012 .013 .062 
Frequency of Bingeing Other -.009 .014 -.034 
Frequency of Talking about Binged TV .088* .043 .126 
ΔR2                                 .093** 
Notes: N = 340, listwise deletion; overall Adjusted R2 = .177; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.10; *** 
p < 0.001 
 
Turning now to RQ4c, the dimension of fantasy was examined as the dependent 
variable. Again, the regression model suggested that the number of programs binged did 
not serve as a statistically significant predictor of fantasy. However, additional genre-
related findings emerged. Similar to the previous two empathy dimensions, the frequency 
of bingeing action and adventure programming was a statistically significant predictor of 
fantasy (B = -.050, SE = .016, p < .001), with a moderate-to-strong and negative effect 
when comparing standardized Betas: (β = -.244). Thus, with every increased step in 
frequency of bingeing action and adventure television, the level of fantasy decreases 
.050.  
Just as with empathic concern, binge-watching crime drama served as statistically 
significant predictor of fantasy (B = .028, SE = .014, p < .05), with a relatively moderate 
effect on the full model (β = .146).  ere, as with each increased level of bingeing crime 
dramas, the level of fantasy increases .028. Differing from the previous two empathy 
dimensions, the genre of science-fiction also served as a statistically significant predictor 
of fantasy (B = .030, SE = .014, p < .05) with a moderate effect on the model (β = .155).  
Again, the variable of talking about television binged served as a statistically significant 
predictor of fantasy (B = .190, SE = .043, p < .001), with a relatively moderate-to-strong 
effect on the full model (β = .162), suggesting that with each one-level increase in talking 
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about television shows binged, there is a in a .190 increase in fantasy level. The binge-
behavior block produced a statistically significant R-square change (ΔR2 = .145, p < 
.001), and the full model explained a quite low 12.7% of the variance, according to the 
adjusted R2.  Table 9 summarizes the full model. 
Table 9:  Hierarchical Linear Regression of Fantasy 
 Coefficient (B) Standard Error Beta (β)  
Step 1: Demographics  
Gender (being female) .088 .086 .057 
Age .000 .003 -.174 
Income .017 .034 .026 
Political Ideology Scale (v. liberal – v. 
conservative) -.013 .009 -.093 
ΔR2                                .036* 
Step 2: General Media Use 
Traditional TV Consumption -.013 .009 -.093 
Social Media Use -.001 .010 -.009 
Nontraditional TV Consumption -.002 .004 -.053 
ΔR2                                 .009 
Step 3: Binge Behavior 
Programs Binged in the Past Month .009 .021 .026 
Frequency of Bingeing Comedy .001 .014 .003 
Frequency of Bingeing Political Drama .007 .017 .030 
Frequency of Bingeing Historical Drama -.002 .019 -.010 
Frequency of Bingeing Superhero Drama -.003 .015 -.014 
Frequency of Bingeing Crime Drama .028* .014 .146 
Frequency of Bingeing Dramatic Comedy .019 .014 .100 
Frequency of Bingeing General Drama .019 .014 .100 
Frequency of Bingeing Action - Adventure -.050** .016 -.244 
Frequency of Bingeing Sci-Fi .030* .014 .155 
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Frequency of Bingeing Horror -.007 .013 -.039 
Frequency of Bingeing Thriller -.009 .015 -.045 
Frequency of Bingeing News -.015 .014 -.073 
Frequency of Bingeing Sports -.016 .015 -.075 
Frequency of Bingeing Reality .015 .012 .080 
Frequency of Bingeing Other .013 .014 .368 
Frequency of Talking about Binged TV .190*** .043 .285 
ΔR2                               .145*** 
Notes: N = 340, listwise deletion; overall Adjusted R2 = .127; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.10; *** 
p < 0.001. 
 
Now focusing on RQ4d, personal distress was examined as the dependent 
variable. Again, the regression model suggested that the number of programs binged did 
not serve as a statistically significant predictor of personal distress. The only two 
variables that proved to be statistically significant predictors were age (B = -.008, SE = 
.003, p < .05) and the frequency of bingeing the “other” category of genre (B = .033, SE 
= .017, p < .05). Age offered a relatively moderate, negative effect on the full model (β = 
-.163); with each increase in year of age, the level of personal distress decreases by .008.  
Bingeing the “other” genre also had a weak-to-moderate effect (β = .144); with every 
increased step in frequency of bingeing something “other” than the genres listed, the level 
of personal distress increases .033.  Here, the binge-behavior block was not statistically 
significant. The full model explained a quite small 8.4% of the variance, according to the 
adjusted R2. Table 10 details the full model. 
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Table 10:  Hierarchical Linear Regression of Personal Distress 
 Coefficient (B) Standard Error Beta (β)  
Step 1: Demographics  
Gender (being female) .198 .102 .111 
Age -.008* .003 -.163 
Income -.058 .041 -.080 
Political Ideology Scale (v. liberal – v. 
conservative) -.004 .022 -.009 
ΔR2                                .076*** 
Step 2: General Media Use 
Traditional TV Consumption -.004 .011 -.023 
Social Media Use -.003 .012 -.019 
Nontraditional TV Consumption .004 .004 .087 
ΔR2                              .018 
Step 3: Binge Behavior 
Programs Binged in the Past Month .029 .025 .076 
Frequency of Bingeing Comedy .001 .016 .004 
Frequency of Bingeing Political Drama .010 .020 .038 
Frequency of Bingeing Historical Drama .000 .022 .001 
Frequency of Bingeing Superhero Drama -.016 .017 -.066 
Frequency of Bingeing Crime Drama .004 .016 .017 
Frequency of Bingeing Dramatic Comedy .009 .017 .018 
Frequency of Bingeing General Drama .004 .017 .018 
Frequency of Bingeing Action - Adventure .009 .019 .039 
Frequency of Bingeing Sci-Fi -.009 .017 -.042 
Frequency of Bingeing Horror -.026 .016 -.123 
Frequency of Bingeing Thriller .004 .017 .018 
Frequency of Bingeing News -.025 .017 -.106 
Frequency of Bingeing Sports .001 .018 .003 
Frequency of Bingeing Reality .022 .015 .101 
Frequency of Bingeing Other .033* .017 .144 
Frequency of Talking about Binged TV .076 .050 .098 
ΔR2                               .055 
Notes: N = 340, listwise deletion; overall Adjusted R2 = .084; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.10; *** 
p < 0.001. 
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Talking about binge-watched television. 
Next, this dissertation investigated RQ5 which investigated the extent to which 
respondents talk about the programs they binge-watch. Respondents were asked to share 
the frequency with which they talk to people they know well, like family and close 
friends (never: 6.5%, rarely: 11.5%, sometimes: 28.8%, most of the time: 16.6%, and 
always: 8.0%.), acquaintances (never: 24.2%, rarely: 16.8%, sometimes: 20.0%, most of 
the time: 8.0%, and always: 2.9%.), and strangers and people who have only met online 
(never: 32.8%, rarely: 12.8%, sometimes: 16.6%, most of the time: 5.7%, and always: 
3.8%.). Using the total talking television variable, additional relationships were 
investigated in investigating the following research questions.  
Focusing on RQ6a – b, this dissertation examined the relationship between talking 
about the TV programs binged and political discourse. A bivariate correlation revealed a 
statistically significant, relatively strong, and positive relationship with regard to both 
online (r = .430, p < .001) and offline (r = .416, p < .001) political talk. In order to 
execute a series of one-way ANOVAs to better understand these relationships, first the 
variable of talking about television was transformed into a low-medium-high variable (M 
= 1.65, SD = .59).  Then, the transformed talking TV variable was set as the independent 
factor, with online and offline political engagement as the dependent variables.   
The results suggest statistically significant differences among the frequency of talking 
about TV with regard to both online, F(2, 369) = 26.26, p < .001, equal variances 
assumed, and offline, F(2, 369) = 25.04,  p < .001, equal variances assumed, political 
participation.  Post-hoc comparisons (Games Howell) for online political engagement 
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indicate statistically significant differences among all levels of talking about TV: low (M 
= .38, SD = .58), medium (M = .87, SD = .87), and high (M = 1.43, SD = 1.30).  
Similarly, post-hoc comparisons (Games Howell) for offline political engagement also 
reveal statistically significant differences among all levels: low (M = .71, SD = .65), 
medium (M = 1.14, SD = .80), and high (M = 1.77, SD = 1.22). An evaluation of 
estimated marginal means reveals a steady positive pattern, where the level of 
engagement increases along with the frequency of talking about television.  Figure 13 
summarizes results.  
Figure 13. Estimated marginal means of levels of online and offline political participation 
and frequency of talking about TV programs binge-watched. Both online and offline 
political participation was measured on a scale from zero (never) to four (always). Talking 
about binged TV frequency was categorized as zero (low) to three (high). 
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significant findings emerged.  The relationships between talking about binge-watched 
and talking about politics proved statistically significant for both online (r = .600, p < 
.001) and offline (r = .560, p < .001) discourse with quite strong correlations.  
One-way ANOVAs were executed to further examine the relationships. Results 
suggest statistically significant differences among the frequency of talking about TV with 
regard to participating in both online, F(2, 357) = 67.55, p < .001, equal variances 
assumed, and offline, F(2, 365) = 37.33,  p < .001, equal variances assumed, discourse.  
Post-hoc comparisons (Tukey HSD) for both online and offline political talk revealed 
statistically significant differences among all levels. Figure 14 summarizes the results.  
 
Figure 14. Estimated marginal means of levels of online and offline political talk and 
frequency of talking about TV programs binge-watched. Both online and offline political 
talk was measured on scale of one (never) to five (always).  Talking about binged-TV 
frequency was categorized as zero (low) to three (high). 
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The previously described hierarchical linear regressions demonstrate the ways in 
which talking about binged TV serves as a statistically significant predictor for online (B 
= .196, SE =.051, p < .001) and offline (B = .194, SE =.050, p < .001) political 
participation, as well as online (B = .393, SE =.061, p < .001) and offline (B = .399, SE 
=.053, p < .001) political talk.  More specifically, for both online (β = .220) and offline (β 
= .225) political engagement, comparing standardized Betas demonstrated that the 
talking about binged TV variables had the second strongest effects on the full models. 
More strikingly, for both online (β = .437) and offline (β = .410) political talk, the talking 
about television variable had the strongest effects on the full models when comparing 
standardized Betas.  Please refer to Tables 2, 3, 5, and 6 for full details. 
Qualitative perspective. 
The final research question, RQ7c, investigated the additional topics that emerged 
during conversations about binge-watching television. This specific piece of the 
dissertation aimed to present additional nuance and provide a lens into the reasons why 
talking about binge-watched television might relate with political engagement and 
discourse. A qualitative analysis of open-ended responses suggests that viewers engage in 
discourse about binge-watched television that centers around a somewhat limited array of 
topics. Out of the 526 respondents, 348 (67.7%) provided some sort of response to the 
open-ended question.  
The most commonly discussed topics centered around the quality of the television 
program and its plot. These responses focused most strongly on the TV show itself 
without moving toward application to other topics. Viewers seemed most strongly 
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interested in discussing details of plot twists, character arcs, and story development, 
delving into the reality of the program. For example, one specific respondent stated that 
they discuss, “What happened, what we want to happen” within the show. Another shared 
additional detail about her experience: “Watched the new Sabrina the Teenage witch [sic] 
series on Netflix. Talked about the older series. Compared it to Riverdale series that's set 
in the same universe [sic].” Such responses demonstrate a strong interest in the fictional 
worlds of the stories, focusing on the various programmatic elements.  
Similarly, binge-watchers seemed fascinated by the structural elements of the 
show, such as the writing, directing, and acting. For example, one respondent shared, 
“We also talked about the excellent production values of the BBC, including not only the 
acting, but locations and cost,ing [sic].” Another respondent stated, “The umbrella 
academy [sic] was discussed and the topic of cinematography came up.” Although these 
responses are quite limited in depth, they suggest that individuals take time to parse 
through the production of a program and identify what it takes to craft a truly engaging 
series. 
Respondents also focused on applying the television experiences to their social 
realities. However, these responses were quite limited in number, and often, the 
applications were brief and not explicated in any sort of depth.  For example, one 
response read, “Love and relationships”, and another stated, “Guns, death.” In both cases, 
it seems that the respondent is discussing elements of the television show that led to 
discourse about serious, real-life issues like romance and gun violence. However, the 
terseness of the responses leaves room for interpretation and could benefit from 
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additional discourse with respondents. 
The area of strongest interest to this dissertation centered around civics and 
politics, which was the category with the fewest responses. As described earlier in this 
dissertation, despite the small number of political and politically-adjacent topics, there 
were at least a few responses related to each of the following subcategories: specific 
policies, issues of identity and society, political behavior, public health, and issues of 
political concern. During the analysis, I noticed that some of these responses seemed to 
be precisely situated at the intersection of entertainment and political culture.   
For example, one animated respondent stated, “THE JESSIE SMULLET CASE AND 
HOW IT WAS POLITICALLY MOTIVATED AND HOW HE BRINGS SHAME TO 
AMERICA AND SHOULD BE IN JAIL ; ) [sic]”.  This specific case centered around a 
recent event, where a famous actor staged a homophobic and racist attack on himself. At 
first, when the attack seemed legitimate and was widely reported upon by the press, the 
occurrence generated heated public debate around the treatment of historically oppressed 
groups in America. Once it was revealed that the act was staged by the actor himself, 
additional controversy arose regarding today’s divisive political ecosystem.   
Another respondent mentioned an incident related to the intersection of celebrity, 
justice, and social life, highlighting the recently released Lifetime documentary series 
Surviving R. Kelly. This documentary gives a voice to the young women accusing the 
famed musician of abuse. The respondent stated, “The documentary film on R Kelly [sic] 
about abuse to them [sic] women... It let into the discussion of Hollywood and how 
nothing of good is in it or politics.” This respondent seems to connect the two worlds of 
  
102 
entertainment and politics, identifying the potential harm in industries with deeply 
entrenched dynamics of power.  
An additional respondent revealed the ways in which binge-watching gives way 
to discourse regarding class and identity, “It was a series of basketball dont [sic] recall 
name, but we comment a lot on perpectives [sic] of people in the poor class and rich 
class. Benefits and so on.” This statement exemplifies the ways in which a genre such as 
sports can potentially engender perspective-taking and trigger discourse on social issues.  
 Overall, the open-ended responses shed light into the conversations that emerge 
when discussing binge-watched television. The more common topics center around the 
television programs themselves, including both the content and structural elements.  The 
somewhat limited responses related to civic and social life illustrate a glimpse into the 
ways in which binged TV can engender political talk.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, AND CONCLUSION 
Summary 
This dissertation examined the contemporary television ecosystem as it relates to 
social and civic life through the overarching lens of Apparatgeist Theory (Katz & 
Aakhus, 2002). It explored the current cultural dynamics related to TV consumption and 
the ways in which viewers engage at the intersection of entertainment and politics. 
Integrating the Theory of Networked Publics (boyd, 2010), this dissertation analyzed the 
extent to which the culture of over-the-top TV and the emergent social ritual of binge-
watching speak to our civic sensibilities, engendering political engagement through 
action and discourse. With the intention of further untangling and elucidating these 
relationships, this dissertation explored the roles of various empathy dimensions using the 
Theory of Narrative Empathy (Keen, 2006) to guide the analysis. Overall, the findings 
from this dissertation expand upon and integrate these central theories, particularly 
demonstrating that the social implications of the OTT TV ecosystem and its uses have 
substantial consequences for the public sphere. Engaging in the rituals of binge-watching 
and discussing TV is intricately linked with political engagement, particularly through the 
process of discourse. Individuals are activated through persistent engagement with 
cultural texts, bridging entertainment and civic worlds.  
To more specifically detail the findings in sum, the results from this dissertation 
reinforce those from the earlier study (Groshek & Krongard, 2016) that identified 
positive relationships between streaming television and political engagement, as well as 
political talk. Specifically, results offered support for H1a–b, suggesting that the more 
  
104 
binge-watching, the more political participation among respondents. For both online and 
offline political participation, the amount of binge-watching television remained a 
statistically significant predictor of participation even when included within the final 
block of the hierarchical linear regression.   
Turning toward political talk, binge-watching proved to be statistically significant 
in its positive relationship with engaging in political discourse online and offline.  When 
evaluated through the hierarchical linear regression models, however, the amount of 
binge-watching no longer served as a statistically significant predictor of political 
discourse, falling short of offering sustained and overall support for H2a–b that increased 
time binge-watching television will be positively related to online and offline political 
talk.  
While all genres proved statistically significant in relation to political 
participation through the bivariate correlations and series of ANOVAs, the regression 
models demonstrate that binge-watching news and informational content remained a 
statistically significant predictor when included within the last block of the model, 
speaking to RQ2 and the role of genre in political participation. These findings regarding 
the political power of consuming news and informational content speaks to prior research 
mentioned previously (Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, & Valenzuela, 2012; Norris, 1996, Shah et 
al., 2001). 
Binge-watching specific genres did, indeed, prove to be critical and serve as 
statistically significant predictors of political discourse, speaking to RQ3a – b. Looking 
first at online political talk, consuming news and informational programming remained 
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statistically significant; this finding may not be surprising, since the genre of news and 
informational is a predictor of political participation. The more unexpected genre that 
proved statistically significant was that of horror which will be discussed in more depth 
later in this chapter. The frequency of bingeing dramatic comedies was statistically 
significant and, importantly, negative in its relationship with online political talk. The 
results of the inquiry into genre and talking politics offline proved less surprising than 
that of online discourse, as only news and informational programming remained a 
statistically significant predictor when included within the last block of the linear 
hierarchical regression model.  
One element of the binge-watching ecosystem that proved persistently powerful 
in its relationship to all politically-related variables was talking about the television 
shows binged. Talking about television programs binged proved to be a statistically 
significant predictor of online and offline political participation, speaking to RQ6a – b, as 
well as online and offline political talk, in reference to RQ7a – b, when included within 
the final block of each regression model.  Moreover, the effect of the variable was 
consistently relatively moderate-to-strong in each model when comparing Betas.  
The qualitative findings in particular shed light on the ways in which dialogue 
about binge-watched programs may facilitate civically charged discourse.  The 
intermingling of entertainment and politics, as mentioned within some of the open-ended 
responses, seems to foster dialogue on issues of policy, current events, social life, and 
identity. The results reflect the work of Graham and Hajru (2011) and Graham (2012), as 
well as my some of my previous work (Krongard & Groshek, 2017), which suggested 
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that talking about entertainment media can lead to not only powerful discussions 
regarding politics but also to political action.   
This dissertation initially posited that the link connecting binge-watching 
television with political participation may be empathy; informed by the Theory of 
Narrative Empathy (Keen, 2006), perhaps that living in and seeing the world through the 
eyes of others, even fictionalized others, could serve as social simulations that might alter 
worldviews, encourage perspective-taking, and engender civic action among viewers. 
Although this idea was not presented as an explicit hypothesis, due to the exploratory 
nature of this work and the fact that no previous studies have specifically streaming TV 
and empathy, this query was at the heart of the dissertation, articulated through RQ4a – d.  
However, findings suggest that the quantity of binge-watching does not seem to 
encourage or even relate positively with development of other-oriented dimensions of 
empathy, namely perspective-taking and empathic concern.   
Rather, findings suggest the opposite phenomenon; perspective-taking and 
empathic concern, which are the two dimensions most strongly associated with 
connecting with and understanding the lives of others, are actually negatively related with 
binge-watching television. Notably, the fantasy dimension, which connects consumers 
with personalities depicted in stories, did not seem to engender general empathy or 
perspective-taking, although related positively with binge-watching. Personal distress, the 
self-oriented dimension of empathy, was positively related with binge-watching, 
reinforcing itself as the opposite of empathic concern. 
Within each of the hierarchical linear models, the quantity of binge-watching did 
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not sustain significance as a predictor of any of the empathy dimensions.  However, more 
compelling results emerged with regard to genre, which may be reflective of Keen’s 
(2006, 2016) suggestion that specific storytelling techniques may garner more empathy 
among readers than others. For example, in the field of literary fiction, Keen (2006, 2016) 
indicates that incorporating fully developed, round characters in stories may help garner 
empathy among readers due to the potential for deeper connection. 
Turning first to perspective-taking, the genre of action and adventure remained a 
statistically significant and negative predictor when included within the last block and 
had a moderate effect on the full model. Next, the regressions for both empathic concern 
and fantasy depicted a similar relationship with the action and adventure genre, as it 
remained a statistically significant and negative predictor of both empathy dimensions. 
Unlike action and adventure, the genre of crime drama proved to be a positive and 
statistically significant predictor of both empathic concern and fantasy within the 
hierarchical linear regression. Put differently, viewing crime drama supported other-
oriented dimensions of empathy, while action and adventure undermined them. Science 
fiction also proved statistically significant in its relationship with the fantasy dimension 
of empathy, perhaps due to the elaborate depth of world-building present in these texts 
and the subsequent immersion that occurs as a consumer. However, this is mere 
speculation that could benefit from empirical evaluations of the genre through content 
analyses.  
Talking about the programs binge-watched served as a positive and statistically 
significant predictor for perspective-taking, empathic concern, and fantasy, with the 
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strongest effect in the fantasy model. Notably, personal distress is not included, 
suggesting that talking about binged-watched programs seems to relate with the other-
oriented dimensions of empathy as opposed to self-oriented. This finding is reminiscent 
of the work mentioned earlier from Nathanson et al., (2013) which focused on preschool-
aged children; co-viewing and subsequent discussion led to increased perspective-taking 
among kids.  Therefore, the findings from this dissertation suggest that the process of 
engaging in discourse regarding television content can engender thoughtful, empathic 
processing.  
Theoretical Implications 
Perpetual content: Activating and mobilizing a civic culture. 
Findings from this dissertation reveal the power of theoretical integration; at the 
intersection of Apparatgeist Theory (Katz & Aakhus, 2002) and the Theory of Networked 
Publics (boyd, 2010) emerged dynamic, unique knowledge regarding the civic 
implications of the over-the-top television ecosystem. The overarching frame of 
Apparatgeist Theory ensured a holistic approach, recognizing and designing for the 
dynamic, ever-changing relationships at play among individual needs, social norms, and 
technological evolution. Beginning with a theoretical lens that is built for innovation not 
only allowed but also necessitated space for growth and development of new thinking. 
Deliberate and thoughtful theoretical integration was critical in that it allowed this 
dissertation to explore unique relationships, relationships, and perspectives in a 
multifaceted capacity. 
The findings of this dissertation suggest support for the idea of “perpetual 
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content” which extends the original notion of perpetual contact” (Katz & Aakhus, 2002) 
and applies it to the always-on, digitally enabled culture of OTT television. I am 
suggesting that the term “perpetual content” refers to the social norms associated with 
contemporary television; individuals have the ability to be constantly connected with TV 
content through personal communication technologies and streaming television 
applications. TV content can be consumed anywhere with an internet connection, 
whether passing time in line at a coffee shop or commuting to work via public 
transportation. The television content therefore permeates through all aspects of daily 
life, infiltrating social discourse on and offline.  
This emergent culture of perpetual content is likely the result of several 
combined, intricately intertwined forces. For instance, the individual and social desire for 
personalized, on-demand technologies have resulted in an increase in over-the-top TV.  
The technological features of this emergent media, such as on-demand access to 
seemingly limitless programming, as well as the proliferation of personal communication 
devices, have facilitated binge-behavior among TV consumers. With this increase in 
sustained, intense consumption, viewers are responding positively to, and perhaps 
demanding an increase in, complex, interactive storytelling, which suggests the desire to 
be engaged and empowered as active agents in the television ecosystem (Napoli, 2010; 
Punathambekar, 2010; Agirre, Arrizabalaga, & Espilla, 2016). The Theory of Networked 
Publics (boyd, 2010) under the umbrella of Apparatgeist Theory (Katz & Aakhus, 2002), 
offers a precise civic contribution, enhancing the understanding of OTT television’s full 
social context.   
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Speaking directly to the Theory of Networked Publics (boyd, 2010), these 
findings extend the theory by considering its application to OTT television, which may 
not be the technology that seems to speak most strongly to the theory, at first glance. 
While the theory is traditionally applied to social networks such as Twitter and Facebook, 
this dissertation argues the application of networked publics to internet-enabled 
television. According to boyd (2010), the elements of networked publics are persistence, 
replicability, scalability, and searchability.  Persistence refers to the ways in which online 
spaces capture and save expressions, which may take the form as clicks or saves (boyd, 
2010).  Replicability suggests that the technology allows for duplication of materials 
shared, and scalability refers to the ability for content to reach a wide audience (boyd, 
2010). Searchability is the capacity to access elements of the networks through deliberate 
search (boyd, 2010).   
While OTT television is not precisely a social network, it is, indeed, a connected 
virtual space that integrates social media logic (Dijck, & Poell, 2013) and demonstrates 
the four elements of networked publics described above. Virtual television aggregators, 
such as Netflix and Hulu, save and use all expressions of interest and preference to 
inform suggestions. Users are encouraged to actively choose, curate, and indicate 
programming preferences, and these data can be shared with a wider audience, such as 
advertisers. Content can be searched and accessed through the sites themselves. Most 
importantly, the television content available on these sites is now being manipulated and 
controlled by the user. Content that was once delivered to a passive audience through 
mass media has been placed in the viewers control, giving a sense of ownership over the 
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experience and choice.   
OTT television is unlike a virtual network that serve as spaces for engagement 
such as Facebook or Twitter, and it is also distinct from the concept of participatory TV, 
which focuses on the ability for the public to produce and create their own television 
content (Fish, 2017).  In these examples, citizens directly engage by creating content, 
through overt expressions of participation. However, OTT television serves as a 
connected space that potentially offers fodder to stimulate discourse through active 
engagement with television content, generating civic talk, and perhaps even trains 
consumers as powerful agents and decision-makers through the on-demand, interactive 
TV experience.   
Thus, it seems the functionality of the network itself is empowering users, 
fostering the general habit of active participation (Groshek & Krongard, 2016).  Blending 
the perspectives of Apparatgeist Theory (Katz & Aakhus, 2002) and the Theory of 
Networked Publics (boyd, 2010) reveals that the intermingling of technology, social 
desires, and individual needs has resulted in a culturally activated, connected public. The 
TV experience has been transformed from passive consumption to dynamic participation, 
which is reminiscent of Livingstone’s (2005) idea of questioning and complicating the 
distinction between the audience and the public. When it comes to OTT television, 
individuals are simultaneously viewers, creators, users, and consumers.  They are 
dynamically and ceaselessly activated, in constant engagement with cultural texts. With 
perpetual content comes the infinite intermingling of social worlds and demands, where 
there are fewer barriers between work and leisure, or business and entertainment.  
  
112 
Decades ago, Postman (1985) highlighted this integration of entertainment into 
social and civic life, and asserted that, as a culture, we are amusing ourselves to death due 
to TV’s emphasis on superficiality rather than in-depth understanding.  This dissertation 
suggests support for Postman’s (1985) thesis that entertainment has infiltrated all aspects 
of our cultural worlds.  Perhaps, as Postman (1985) postulated, we will continue to judge 
our institutions, including schools, churches, and the government, based on their capacity 
to amuse. However, this dissertation opposes Postman (1985) in his wide-ranging caution 
of the negative consequences. As Postman states (1985): 
When a population becomes distracted by trivia, when cultural life is redefined as 
a perpetual round of entertainments, when serious public conversation becomes a 
form of baby-talk, when, in short, a people become an audience and their public 
business a vaudeville act, then a nation finds itself at risk; culture-death is a clear 
possibility. (p. 155–56) 
Here, Postman (1985) suggests, through somewhat hyperbolic imagery, the dire results of 
a culture that eternally favors entertainment. This dissertation posits that there are 
actually potential positive outcomes, where discussion of popular culture might, in fact, 
foster civically stimulated discourse and even increase political engagement.  The 
evidence presented in this dissertation suggests that perhaps individuals are activated 
rather than distracted by trivia; people may become an audience but that audience, in 
turn, may become a civic public.  
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Contact through content. 
Further integrating these two major theories, these findings suggest an 
intermingling of perpetual contact with content. In other words, the media consumed 
actually invigorates interpersonal connection, thus enabling the discourse and 
empowerment necessary for an activated public. Engaging with binge-watched television 
provides individuals with the stimuli necessary to begin considering social issues, civic 
life, and the ways in which these ideas might apply to their social realities. Such themes 
and topics provide rousing fodder for dialogue, which then may engender action.  
These findings directly speak to the previous work of researchers who have 
pushed back against the original contributions of Habermas (1962/1989) and his strict 
emphasis on rationality as a necessity for discourse in the public sphere. As mentioned 
previously, examples of such facilitators of the public sphere included humor (Benacka, 
2016) and gossip (Frost, 2011; Temple, 2012). This dissertation contributes the addition 
of binge-watched television as an important triggering topic of conversation that 
engenders civic discourse, where seemingly frivolous topics can have serious 
consequences, building upon previous research that examined pop culture’s role in civic 
engagement (Jenkins, 2012; Graham, 2012; Graham & Hajru, 2011; van Zoonen, 2004).   
Graham and Hajru (2011) and Graham (2012) examined the ways in which reality 
TV online discussion forums facilitated civic discourse among contributors, suggesting 
that topics regarding lifestyle and behavioral choices triggered political talk. But pivoting 
away from Graham and Hajru (2011) and Graham (2012), findings from this dissertation 
speak not only to online discussion forums but also to offline interactions, indicating that 
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talking about binged-television generates civic discourse across virtual and in-personal 
social contexts. Furthermore, this dissertation is unique from Graham and Hajru (2011) 
and Graham’s (2012) work in that it explored a variety of genres, rather than focusing 
specifically on one.  While only the news and informational genre served as a significant 
predictor of offline political discourse, it is important to highlight the horror genre as a 
significant predictor of online political discourse.  
Perhaps discussing horror films online leads to civic discussion due to the nature 
of the genre. In their investigation of reality television online discussion forums, Graham 
and Hajru (2011) suggest that reality TV explicitly “publicizes the private” (p. 29) and 
therefore lends itself to discussions regarding lifestyle and social behavior. It is possible 
that the horror genre also “publicizes the private” via symbolism, in that it reveals the 
inner-lives of viewers through metaphorical representations. Often, the horror genre 
employs creatures, monsters, or terror situations that symbolically speak to the 
experiences of underrepresented or historically oppressed groups (Schneider, 1999).  
Contemporary examples of horror films that are deliberately metaphorical in their 
representations of unjust social realities are Get Out (2017) and Us (2019), both from 
director Jordan Peele, which illustrate the experiences of Black people in contemporary 
America (Nichols, 2018).   
These films exemplify the ways in which the horror genre can serve as a vehicle 
to reveal the perspectives and experiences of oppressed groups. Furthermore, due to the 
potential appeal to underrepresented groups, horror is a genre that has garnered a cult 
following (i.e. Jancovich, 2000; Wood, 2003). Invoking the connection between fandom 
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and civic participation, as suggested by authors such as Brough and Shresthova (2012), 
Jenkins (2012), and van Zoonen (2005), it is conceivable that participation in online 
horror fandom blends into civic engagement. While the idea that horror fans are activated 
as empowered citizens cannot be confirmed purely with the findings from this 
dissertation, it seems that there ought to be future research investigating the ways in 
which horror fandom manifests in online discussions and the extent to which this 
discourse relates with political and civic life.  
Thus, the culture of perpetual content suggests that the contemporary audience-as-
civic-public remains consistently entertained and civically activated, existing within a 
reality that not only integrates fluff with substance but also uses engagement with the 
superficial to propel serious action. This finding reinforces the need to take seemingly 
frivolous, popular culture more seriously, which will be explored in greater depth later in 
this chapter within the proposed policy implications. In other words, discussion about and 
engagement with popular culture needs to be not only tolerated but encouraged in order 
to facilitate greater public discourse and political participation.  
Over-the-top television and empathy: Genre matters.  
The most striking findings that emerged with regard to empathy and binge-
watching related to the roles of various genres. As mentioned previously, Keen’s (2006) 
Theory of Narrative Empathy maintains that various storytelling techniques may be more 
likely to garner empathy than others, such as the development of full, complex characters 
or first-person narration. In considering differences among genres, perhaps specific 
genres employ, or abstain from employing, similar storytelling techniques that speak to 
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these different dimensions of empathy (Keen, 2006; 2016; Koopman, 2015; Turner & 
Felisberti, 2018).  
Turning first to the genre of action and adventure, which related negatively with 
the other-oriented dimensions of empathy, critical analyses of the genre were consulted.  
Gallagher (2006) examines the ways in which action and adventure films throughout 
history have illustrated contemporary vision of the masculine ideal and national identity. 
Neale (2004) examines the hallmarks of the genre, identifying violence, physical stunts, 
graphic effects, and representations of masculinity, particularly from a physical 
perspective. Prior research has demonstrated negative relationship between exposure to 
media violence and empathy (Fraser et al., 2012; Funk, Baldacci, Pasold, & 
Baumgardner, 2004), and therefore, perhaps it is not surprising that such a definitively 
violent genre is unsupportive of other-oriented empathy. Furthermore, through Keen’s 
(2006) lens, perhaps empathy-generating storytelling techniques such as highlighting the 
inner lives of characters or developing full, round characters are missing from the action 
and adventure genre.  
Alternatively, the crime drama genre related positively with other-oriented 
dimensions of empathy. In her analysis of the crime drama genre, Turnbull (2014) 
examines the appeal of such programming and cites Sparks (1992) who identifies crime 
dramas as modern morality tales that demonstrate how society ought to work, suggesting 
an eye toward justice. This statement is reminiscent of the entertainment-education genre 
(Singhal, Cody, Rogers, & Sabido, 2003), where the programming is deliberately crafted 
with a lesson encouraging positive social behaviors and norms. Perhaps true crime offers 
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similar lessons regarding expected behaviors, wrong-doing, and consequences, thus 
pushing viewers to consider the points of view of the many parties involved within the 
program.  
Further investigating crime dramas, Mancini (2013) offered empirical support for 
the CSI Effect, which asserts heavy viewing of crime dramas alters perceptions of the 
jury system. Mancini’s (2013) study of actual jurors found that heavy viewers of crime 
dramas offered more frequent acquittals than light viewers, perhaps due to the habit of 
humanizing the perpetrator. It would be beneficial to further study the onslaught of 
contemporary true crime dramas that have  garnered great popularity (Bolin, 2018; 
Houpt, 2018; Mullan, 2018), such television series and miniseries The Staircase (2014 –), 
The Making of a Murderer (2015 –), The Jinx (2015), and The Keepers (2017), as well as 
the podcast Serial (2014 –) to illustrate the extent to which the accused are portrayed, 
humanized, and received by viewers. This idea for future work is detailed later in the 
chapter.  
Concluding thoughts on theoretical implications. 
From a theoretical perspective, this dissertation extended Apparatgeist Theory to 
the current OTT television ecosystem and contributed new knowledge on the civic 
consequences of perpetual content. It offered the Theory of Networked Publics a unique 
virtual space for consideration, that of connected OTT television, which allows TV 
viewers to practice participatory habits of active engagement. Blending the two major 
theories, this dissertation highlighted the power of talking about television, where content 
consumed serves as a trigger for serious, civic discourse. With regard to genre, horror 
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emerged as a powerful contributor to civic discussion, while empathy revealed additional 
genre differences.  Action and adventure proved detrimental to other-oriented dimensions 
of empathy while crime drama was supportive. Cumulatively, this dissertation provides 
substantial fodder for future research which will be explored in depth later in this chapter.  
Methodological Implications 
From a methodological perspective, this dissertation offered contributions 
regarding language use and measurement for the topics of binge-watching and empathy. 
To review, this dissertation first executed a pilot survey to inform the development of the 
main survey, which included a questionnaire with opportunities for open-ended responses 
to access the perspectives, experiences, and opinions of adults living in the United States 
regarding binge-watching, political engagement, and empathy. The pilot survey was 
invaluable in the development of the survey to ensure the language used spoke to the 
needs of the respondent.  It also revealed the challenge of measurement for certain 
ambiguous or complex terms such as “genre” and “binge-watch,” resulting in detailed 
definitions and illuminating examples of such terms integrated within the main survey. 
Responses to the main survey provided the opportunities to evaluate the data using a 
variety of statistical tests which suggest correlational and predictive relationships.  The 
qualitative piece provided a helpful complement to bolster and enhance the statistical 
analyses, which ought to be standard within survey-based methods to add greater nuance 
to the numerical findings.  
With regard to genre, this dissertation intended to identify differences in political 
engagement and empathy development depending on what viewers consumed. Using the 
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Netflix binge-scale (“Netflix and binge,” 2016), the pilot survey tested responses to a 
nuanced, detailed typology of genre. Past communication research has employed 
potentially incomplete lists of genres, such as Cohen and Weimann’s (2000) examination 
of cultivation differences which included the genres of “news, suspense and horror, 
MTV, sports programs, politics and current events, game and quiz shows, soap operas, 
comedies, and films” (p. 104). While the Cohen and Weimann (2000) study resulted in 
beneficial findings that contributed to the body of knowledge of cultivation theory 
(Gerbner & Gross, 1976), this genre list is not certainly exhaustive; for instance, it 
neglects all dramas other than soap operas, and it identifies “films” as a genre rather than 
a separate art form. Furthermore, this dissertation intended to incorporate a list of genres 
that spoke to the OTT television landscape, which further motivated the use of the Netflix 
binge-scale, and that also resonated with respondents.   
Thus, the pilot survey revealed that the Netflix binge-scale was not exhaustive 
from the perspective of respondents. To remedy this, the main survey responded to these 
findings and incorporated the additions of general drama, news and informational 
(including documentaries), sports and commentaries, reality television, and other, per the 
suggestion of many pilot survey respondents. To review, the full list of genres employed 
within the main survey is as follows: irreverent comedies, political dramas, historical 
dramas, superhero dramas, crime dramas, dramatic comedies, general dramas, action and 
adventure, science-fiction, horror, thrillers, news and informational, sports including 
games and commentaries, reality programs, and other. At first glance, this list may appear 
to include too many subgenres of drama.  However, the results suggest that this nuance is 
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important, as there were significant differences that emerged among them, such as the 
relationship between other-oriented empathy and crime dramas. 
Moving forward, future research could contribute to crafting an even more 
detailed, exhaustive list of genres to continue parsing their influence. For example, only 
two subgenres of comedy are included in this list which may prove unexhaustive. Future 
work could integrate past analyses from the field of genre theory (i.e. Sobchack & 
Sobchack, 1980; Chandler, 1997) with a content analyses of current OTT television 
comedies to identify contemporary comedy subgenres popular within the contemporary 
TV environment, such as slapstick comedy, dark comedy, or satire. The current 
dissertation offers a starting off point to help move empirical, quantitative research on 
genre viewership into the OTT TV world.  
Policy Implications 
From a policy perspective, the findings from this study suggest possible vehicles 
for increased political participation and engagement that ought to be taken seriously, 
despite TV’s reputation as a superficial medium (Postman, 1985), particularly with 
regard to access and education.  
Access: The digital divide. 
The findings from the dissertation suggests that spending time with OTT 
television content may garner increased political participation. However, the digital 
divide continues to persist across the United States, where there are stark contrasts among 
those who have access to technology and those who do not. The digital divide perpetuates 
inequality and thereby adds obstacles to universal political participation. From a 
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socioeconomic perspective, according to the Pew Research Center, 29% of adults whose 
household income is below $30,000 per year do not own smartphone, while 44% do not 
have broadband services at home, and 46% do not own a traditional computer (Anderson 
& Kumar, 2019). Here, income proposes a serious obstruction to participatory media and 
opportunities for engagement.   
Further, these inequalities reflect power and privilege dynamics among racial and 
ethnic groups, as a recent study revealed that 83% of White people living in the United 
States own a desktop or laptop computer while 66% of Blacks and 60% of Hispanics 
indicated ownership (Perrin, 2017). However, with regard to race and ethnicity, the gap is 
decreased through smartphone ownership. While approximately 75% of Black and White 
respondents in the United States reported owning a smartphone, 88% of native-born 
Hispanics and 62% of Hispanics born abroad also own a smartphone (Perrin, 2017). 
Smartphones are a major means for accessing the Internet, particularly for those who do 
not have broadband access at home (Anderson, 2019).   
In recent years, there has been a movement internationally toward decreasing this 
gap in access with activism surrounding the right to internet access. In 2016, the United 
Nations Human Rights Council passed a resolution that asserts online freedom as a 
human right, via Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “Everyone has 
the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold 
opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas 
through any media and regardless of frontiers” (The United Nations, 2016, p. 5). The 
following year, the United Kingdom confirmed that the Universal Service Obligation will 
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deliver high-speed internet to all residents by the year 2020 (“High-speed broadband,” 
2017).   
In the United States, similar efforts have been made in this direction, with the 
Internet for All Act that became law in California in 2017 and the New NY Broadband 
Program, which ensured that 99.9% of New Yorkers received high-speed Internet access 
by the end of 2018 (Tveten, 2018). The Federal Communications Commission continues 
movement forward with efforts to increase access to high-speed Internet across the 
United States, such as its Connect America Fund which aims to make broadband access 
more affordable in rural areas (Wigfield, 2018).    
 Increased access to the hardware and software necessary to participate in this 
media-saturated environment presents a step toward closing the digital divide. However, 
further gaps persist with regard to education, specifically the digital media literacy skills 
necessary to engage effectively with technology (Carvin, 2000; “Digital equity,” 2018; 
“Evaluating information,” 2018; Holland, 2018; Rideout & Katz, 2016).  In this vein, 
research suggests that access and education are intricately linked; the Consortium for 
School Networking found a negative correlation between access to technology and 
literacy (“Digital equity,” 2018). In other words, those with access demonstrated higher 
digital literacy skills than those without. To wit, both universal access and education must 
be achieved in order to fully address this disparity.  
As Carvin (2000) suggested nearly two decades ago, the digital divide is about not 
only technology access but also pedagogy, content, literacy, and community. With regard 
to pedagogy, educators must integrate technology to foster constructivist, learning-
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centered, and media-enhanced learning environments (Carvin, 2000). Considering 
content and community, Carvin (2000) suggests that the Internet offers a wealth of 
resources, including information, global perspectives, and networks, but requires 
guidance to effectively navigate and capitalize upon these opportunities. Furthermore, 
basic literacy needs must be addressed prior to digital literacy, as more than 20% of 
adults in the United States struggle with basic reading skills (Strauss, 2016). 
Thus, this dissertation presents yet another argument for the importance of 
universal access to Internet, technology, and media literacy education. Through 
entertainment-based engagement with participatory media, individuals can be civically 
stimulated and propelled to political participation. Civic engagement is necessary for a 
thriving democracy, where participation among all citizens is imperative (Norris, 2001). 
Allowing the digital divide to persist only perpetuates the systemic inequalities that 
pervade the United States. Ensuring equal access to information, education, and 
communication helps cultivate a society where all voices can participate in an active, 
dynamic democracy. 
Media education interventions.   
This dissertation recognizes the vast and comprehensive efforts of educators with 
regard to media and digital literacy. The findings presented in this dissertation offer areas 
of focus for future media education interventions at the K–16 levels. For context on 
media education initiatives, scholar Renee Hobbs (2011) identifies the two overarching 
goals of digital and media literacy efforts as 1.) using popular culture, mass media, and 
digital technologies to foster critical thinking skills and 2.) encouraging young people to 
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be responsible and effective communicators. The National Association for Media 
Literacy Education defines media literacy as “the ability to access, analyze, evaluate, 
create, and act using all forms of communication is interdisciplinary by nature” (“Media 
literacy defined,” 2019). In other words, media education empowers young people as 
savvy and critical consumers, users, and creators of media. The importance of media 
literacy is incorporated within the Common Core Standards, which are curricular and 
academic standards implemented in 2010 that were adopted by forty-one states 
(“Standards in your state,” 2019). Thus, educators throughout the country are being 
encouraged to thoughtfully and deliberately design opportunities for media education 
within public K-12 classrooms.  
While there is substantial overlap among the two terms, there are some 
distinctions in focus with regard to “digital” versus “media” literacies. To focus more 
specifically on detailed objectives rather than overarching principles, digital literacy 
highlights the importance of responsible creation and curation, as well as participation in 
digital communities of learners (Hobbs, 2019). Turning toward media literacy, Hobbs 
(2019) identifies the importance of understanding media systems and the political 
economy that drives these structures, as well as its influence on democratic processes.  
That said, for the purpose of this dissertation, the term “media education” encompasses 
all forms of both media and digital literacy efforts (Buckingham, 2003).  
The findings from this dissertation can offer insights into certain dimensions of 
media education efforts, specifically regarding the role of discourse. As discussed 
previously, talking about binged-watched television shows proved to be a significant 
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predictor of online and offline political participation, discourse, and other-oriented 
dimensions of empathy. Therefore, talking about television is, indeed, a powerful, 
prosocial practice. When incorporating popular culture into media education initiatives, it 
is therefore important to not only create space and opportunities for young people to talk 
about the programs watched but also scaffold the skills necessary to engage effectively in 
these discussions.   
With regard to scaffolding for effective discourse, learners within media 
education contexts should first engage in activities where they cultivate and practice 
developing a vocabulary to discuss popular culture, beyond identifying the elements that 
they liked and disliked. Learners ought to be encouraged to delve more deeply through 
prompting language that pushes them to consider examples and rationales to support their 
claims, while still allowing discussion to be free flowing and relatively casual, reflective 
of natural, everyday discussion. Here, learners are inspired to work cognitively with what 
they already know and then develop this understanding further in an effort to foster 
ongoing, sustained inquiry (Wiske, Rennebohm, & Briet, 2005). Fostering this type of 
open and dynamic conversation in a classroom setting requires the development of a 
specific culture, where the norms of respect, vulnerability, and trust are paramount. 
From a curriculum and instruction perspective, young people ought to be 
encouraged to bring their own viewership experiences into the conversation, rather than 
focusing on media examples presented by the instructor. Providing young people with the 
opportunities to offer topics that speak to their personal passions allows for greater 
connectedness to the learning experience and increased agency (Wiske, Rennebohm, & 
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Briet, 2005). This approach ensures the instructor is meeting learners where they are, 
rather than imposing culturally irrelevant or confusing examples (Hunt, 2001).  
Ultimately, scaffolding the experience and offering learners the chance to practice 
engaging in thoughtful discussions about popular culture may then extend into their daily 
lives, as the social and educational lives of learners can be integrated to inform and 
benefit one another (Kincheloe, Slattery, & Steinberg, 2000). Encouraging these 
conversations in learning settings could help to cultivate prosocial habits that persist as 
their media diets change and evolve. As media educators, policy-makers, and education 
reform advocates consider the ways in which technology is transforming education, the 
power of pop culture-driven discourse ought to be identified as a powerful tool for 
engagement.  
Directions for Future Research 
In-depth qualitative perspective of perpetual content. 
 As mentioned previously, this study would most certainly benefit from a more 
substantial, comprehensive qualitative investigation of the OTT television ecosystem.  
Through a series of in-depth interviews with binge-watchers of all ages across the United 
States, this future study could better understand the following in detail: 1.) the role of 
binge-watching in the lives of viewers, 2.) the contexts that support engaging in discourse 
surrounding these programs, 3.) the topics that emerge during discussions on binged 
television, and 4.) the ways in which binge-watching television relates with civic identity 
and political engagement. This future work is imperative for truly understanding this 
fascinating emergent phenomenon.  
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 To delve into these four areas in more detail, it would be fascinating to first better 
understand how binge-watching arises within the lives of viewers and the extent to which 
it is socially charged. For example, is viewership driven by the urge for social capital and 
the ability to engage in conversation about popular culture?  Secondly, and perhaps most 
exciting, this qualitative investigation could tease out the environments and settings that 
support these powerful conversations. For example, where are these conversations taking 
place both on and offline?  How are the spaces designed?  How are topics presented?  
Who are the players involved?  These are just a few of the details that would help to 
illuminate the ways in which these civically stimulated, pop culture driven discussions 
are taking place. 
 From there, it would be important to parse the topics that arise during these 
discussions, specifically investigating the potentially meandering paths that these 
conversations take to arrive at civic discourse. For example, what was it about the show 
in question that led the dialogue to social issues or civic life? The next natural topic for 
these interviews would be regarding political engagement, illuminating the unique details 
that move individuals from discourse to action. This final element of this future 
qualitative study would be critical, as media educators could use this information to 
facilitate civic engagement through pop culture discourse.  
 Turning specifically to the dimension of other-oriented empathy, it would be 
important to understand the ways in which viewers discuss the shows they binge to 
evaluate the extent to which they are practicing social-perspective taking in these 
conversations. Consistent with Kim et al. (2018), perhaps television indeed serves as a 
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necessary social simulation to engender discourse where viewers are articulating and 
positioning the perspectives of characters, thereby practicing the skills of social 
perspective-taking. Detailed analysis of the conversations viewers have about these 
programs could shed light on the extent to which they are detailing the perspectives of 
characters, thus further revealing the power of TV to foster empathic development.  
Examining the role of fandom. 
The body of scholarship in civic media would benefit from deeper investigations 
into fandom’s relationship with binge-watching and political participation. As mentioned 
previously, Jenner (2015) suggests that binge-watching has transformed fandom from a 
cult form of intense engagement to a more mainstream way of interacting with media 
texts. Binge-watching has made super-fans out of casual fans due to the intensity it 
demands. Prior scholarship has suggested a link between fandom behaviors and political 
participation, actually identifying fandom as a pathway to civic engagement (Brough & 
Shresthova, 2012). van Zoonen (2005) highlighted the ways in which engagement in 
fandom behaviors can serve as demonstrations and practice for active citizenship.  
Jenkins (2006, 2012) reinforces this idea, suggesting that fandom allows individuals to 
practice engaging in the social organization and cultural production necessary for civic 
life. Fandom encourages activist behaviors and habits that may transfer into social 
worlds; perhaps fandom serves as a connector, fostering participation, engagement, and 
even citizenship. 
Thus, it would be useful for future research to empirically investigate this link 
between binge-watching, the mainstreaming of fandom, and the increased civic 
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engagement. To this end, it would be beneficial to first explore the ways in which binge-
watchers participate with television texts, without necessarily adhering to previously 
articulated definitions of fandom; because binge-watching exists within this emergent, 
internet-enabled television ecosystem, it may necessitate a distinctive, original starting 
point rather than building upon the work of traditional TV. In other words, binge-
watching fandom might, indeed, manifest differently than traditional forms of fandom.  
For example, the McMillan and Chavis (1986) measure of sense of psychological 
community is frequently used to measure fandom in survey-based research (i.e. 
Chadborn, Edwards, & Reysen, 2018; Tsay-Vogel & Sanders, 2017; Obst, Zinkiewicz, & 
Smith, 2002). This measurement assesses belonging, fulfillment of needs, influence, and 
shared connections (McMillan & Chavis, 1986); however, it is possible that binge-
watching propels different forms of fandom that have not yet been established within the 
field.  
In a similar vein, Napoli and Kosterich (2017) analyze the ways in which fandom 
is measured in the contemporary climate of social analytics, highlighting the 
incompleteness and inaccuracies inherent in these technologically-driven approaches to 
fandom measurement. Here, Napoli and Kosterich (2017) illustrate that while this 
information may demonstrate viewership and interactions with media texts, these data are 
not necessarily complete in measuring the full concept of fandom. Therefore, the field 
would benefit from multimethod investigation, including a survey and in-depth 
interviews, to understand the detailed the ways in which binge-watchers participate as 
enthusiastic supporters of specific programs and connect not only with the content but 
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also with other viewers. Perhaps binge-watchers do not necessarily self-identify as avid 
fans but are, in fact, practicing fan-like behaviors such as engaging with others about the 
programs in some capacity. Abercrombie and Longhurst (1998) identify the difference 
between general consumers and fans as the quantity of engagement in communal 
activities about the pop culture text.  
Understanding the perspectives of binge-watchers themselves would provide a 
helpful starting point for further studies to analyze the ways in which these fan-like 
behaviors relate with genres consumed, such as horror, and political participation. Then, 
using the findings from the proposed survey and interviews, additional studies could 
examine the extent to which an OTT TV fandom variable serves as a predictor of binge-
watching and political participation.  
Multimethod investigation of genre.  
 As mentioned previously, some of the most pivotal findings from this study 
centered around genre differences. Generally, future research ought to systematically 
analyze traditions, tropes, and methods of representation through content analyses within 
the most frequently binged programs from each genre to understand the stories being 
proliferated. Next, it would be critical to learn about interpretations of each genre from 
viewers themselves through surveys and in-depth interviews. These findings could be 
complemented by analyses of social media discourse to reveal the ways in which fans 
discuss these genres via platforms such as Facebook and Twitter.  
Considering the relationships among genre and political engagement, it would be 
particularly important to analyze the genre of horror, examining the most frequently 
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binged horror programming to understand its relationship with civics and politics. It 
would be illuminating to adopt a critical perspective, where these popular media texts 
were analyzed substantially for their symbolic and metaphorical representations. Delving 
more deeply into this subject matter, the findings from this dissertation would benefit 
from an analysis of online horror fandom communities to detail the ways in which 
discourse about horror texts triggers political and civic discussions online. Such a study 
could follow in the tradition of Graham and Harju (2011) and Graham (2012), which 
were discussed previously, in illuminating empirically the elements of these discussions, 
and more importantly of the genre in general, that may lead to political stimulated 
conversations among viewers.  
It would also be advantageous to the field for future content analyses to 
investigate the genre of dramatic comedies in order to better understand their negative 
relationships with political talk. More specifically, perhaps future work could identify the 
topics that arise within these programs to illuminate the values perpetuated in these 
stories. It would be curious to assess the extent to which any social, civic, or political 
issues arise and the contexts for such subject matter in popular dramatic comedies.  
From the perspective of empathy development, the genre of action and adventure 
ought to be examined, particularly due to its negative relationship with other-oriented 
dimensions of empathy. This content analysis could explore representations of the heroes, 
villains, story arcs, and perhaps the depictions of violence to better understand its 
relationship with empathy. Next, the crime-drama genre should also be examined to 
understand the ways in which it facilitates other-oriented dimensions of empathy. 
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Notably, both action and adventure and crime drama genres are often wrought with 
violence; to this end, it would be compelling to compare how violence is depicted in both 
genres to evaluate whether there are systemic differences in the portrayals.   
Limitations  
There are several limitations to this study. First, looking at the sample, the 
oversampling of females and overall small size of the sample limits the generalizability 
of these findings. Future studies that intend to expand upon this work ought to ameliorate 
this issue by identifying and accessing a more representative sample with regard to 
gender. Additionally, the use of a Qualtrics opt-in panel of respondents leaves room for 
bias, again jeopardizing precise generalizability, in that these respondents are paid to 
participate in surveys and may not necessarily be representative of the full population.  
However, comparable samples are being used in the field and apply inferential statistics, 
suggesting that this is not only standard for the discipline but also results in helpful 
contributions to the discipline (Baker et al., 2010; Peifer & Garrett, 2014; Boulianne, 
2015).   
With regard to the instrument, this questionnaire relied on self-report data, which 
are inherently biased and imperfect. For example, as mentioned within the Method 
section of this dissertation, some respondents shared that they spent well over twenty-
four hours a day consuming television. However, due to second-screening and media 
multi-tasking, there is a possibility that these responses are reflective of their experiences.  
While the memories of respondents and their ability to estimate time spent on specific 
tasks are necessarily imperfect, this dissertation deemed it invaluable to access the 
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perspectives and experiences of viewers.  It is critical to understand the perspectives of 
those studied, and perhaps future work could employ additional methods to corroborate 
findings, ensuring quality control.   
Additionally, as demonstrated within the pilot-survey, many of the constructs 
examined within this project are a bit ambiguous and interpreted subjectively. Despite the 
fact that this study used the pilot survey to inform the main survey and help to address 
these challenges, there may be some variation in the ways in which respondents 
understood the questions being asked due to the inherently ambiguous subject matter of 
genre. That said, such challenges are unavoidable when investigating new and potentially 
murky concepts; it would be a mistake for future research to avoid these subjects for fear 
of misinterpretations. Rather, it is necessary to take action to help mitigate confusion or 
misunderstanding, which is precisely what the pilot survey aimed to do.  
Finally, this is a cross-sectional study, suggesting that while the data suggest 
relationships, no causality can be proven. The relationships in question could be further 
examined thought deliberate mediation analysis in future research. However, this is an 
exploratory study on an emergent, new phenomenon.  Thus, these initial findings serve as 
a compelling starting place for future longitudinal studies to build upon, evaluating the 
persistence of such findings over time.  
Concluding Statement 
Informed by an integration of Apparatgeist Theory (Katz & Aakhus, 2002) and 
the Theory of Networked Publics (boyd, 2010), this dissertation uncovers a dynamic 
interplay among the current internet-enabled television ecosystem and the activated 
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audience-as-public. Considering current trends and future directions (“The Nielsen Total 
Audience Report,” 2018), OTT television will become increasingly prevalent, as TV 
users engage with content from anywhere, on a variety of personal and wearable devices.  
A major consequence of this dissertation is the emergence of what can be identified as 
the OTT effect: through a culture of perpetual content and the technology of OTT 
television, we are not only eternally entertained but also persistently informed, resulting 
in a state of civic stimulation.  
A critical finding of this dissertation and a key component to the current media 
ecosystem is the power of dialogue and the ways in which popular culture can engender 
discourse that leads not only to political engagement but also to increased other-oriented 
dimensions of empathy, which are associated with various prosocial behaviors (i.e. Ang 
& Goh, 2010; Doyle & Aboud, 1995; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000). Thus, it is 
imperative that individuals are empowered with the vocabulary and the opportunities to 
engage in dynamic discourse about popular culture, particularly binged television.  
Despite the fact that talking about popular culture, and television in particular, may have 
the reputation of frivolity, this dissertation highlights its powerful, and serious, potential 
to augment democratic discourse and civic life.     
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